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ABSTRACT 
 Political demonstrations occur frequently worldwide. The frequency of these 
events will surely increase with the upcoming U.S. presidential election. Law 
enforcement entities must prepare for these events from a variety of frameworks and be 
aware of current terrorist trends and the potential for attacks at demonstrations. This 
thesis presents case studies of two political demonstrations—the Unite the Right rally in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, and the yellow jacket protests in France—as well as three terror 
attacks—the Chelsea bombing, the Queens hatchet attack, and the Westside Highway 
ramming attack, analyzing them through the lens of the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD)’s political demonstration and counterterrorism policies. This thesis 
concludes with recommendations for the NYPD in improving its current policies and for 
urban police departments in applying the NYPD’s demonstration methodology to their 
own practices. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As the 2020 and 2024 U.S. presidential elections approach, an uptick in political 
protests is inevitable. Law enforcement agencies must fully prepare to police these political 
protests as well as secure them from any potential terrorist activity. Recent terrorist attacks, 
such as the vehicle ramming attacks in Charlottesville, Virginia, and on West Street in New 
York City, have demonstrated the forms of violence facing law enforcement at political 
protests. 
A. CASE STUDIES 
This thesis presents case studies of two political demonstrations and three terror 
attacks. The political demonstrations include the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, and the yellow jacket protests in Paris, France. The terror attacks analyzed include 
the Chelsea bombing, the Queens hatchet attack, and the Westside Highway attack. These 
case studies help to identify ways in which demonstrations have vulnerabilities to these 
styles of attack. Following the case studies, the researcher evaluated the New York City 
Police Department (NYPD)’s policing policies for political demonstrations. 
The Unite the Right rally was held in Charlottesville, Virginia, on the weekend of 
August 11–12, 2017. The themes from this event included vehicle ramming 
attacks, active shooter situations, and tactical considerations.1  
In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron signed a bill raising the taxes on 
diesel fuel to help France become more environmentally friendly.2 The themes 
from this event include fire as both a weapon and distraction, the use of hard-style 
policing, and the use of tear gas. After the protests became popular in fall 2018, 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria released images on Twitter of attacks against 
 
1 Hunton & Williams, Final Report: Independent Review of the 2017 Protest Events in Charlottesville, 
Virginia (Richmond, VA: Hunton & Williams, 2017), 144, https://www.huntonak.com/images/content/
3/4/v4/34613/final-report-ada-compliant-ready.pdf. 
2 Jake Cigainero, “Who Are France’s Yellow Vest Protesters, and What Do They Want?,” National 
Public Radio, December 3, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/12/03/672862353/who-are-frances-yellow-
vest-protesters-and-what-do-they-want. 
xviii 
the yellow jacket protestors.3 The image contained a quote in Arabic that 
translated to, “Oh lone wolves, exploit the demonstrations and kill the unbelievers 
in France.”4 The images contained a vehicle with blood splattered on the hood 
and a hand holding a knife.5  
On September 17, 2016, Ahmad Khan Rahami placed a series of pressure cooker–
style improvised explosive devices in New York City and pipe bombs in New 
Jersey. The themes from this incident included active shooter protocols and 
terrorism trends.  
October 23, 2014, was a rainy day in the commercial district of Jamaica, Queens. 
Rookie NYPD Officers Kenneth Healy, Joseph Meeker, Taylor Kraft, and Peter 
Rivera, were assigned to foot patrol in the area.6 As the officers posed for a 
picture, Zale Thompson charged the officers with a hatchet and delivered a 
number of blows.7 The element of distraction was a part of this case study.  
Sayfullo Saipov entered the bicycle lane that runs north and south on the west side 
of West Street at Houston Street, approximately 20 minutes after entering New 
York.8 He traveled southbound, killing eight people and injuring 11.9 The themes 




3 Annabel Murphy, “ISIS Calls on Fanatics to Kill Unbelievers at French Fuel Protests,” The Sun 




6 Daniel Prendergast, “Cop Who Survived Hatchet Attack Gets NYPD’s Medal of Honor,” New York 
Post, June 14, 2016, https://nypost.com/2016/06/14/cop-who-survived-hatchet-attack-gets-nypds-medal-of-
honor/. 
7 J. David Goodman, “New York City Police Kill Man Who Hit 2 Officers with Hatchet,” New York 
Times, December 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/nyregion/new-york-police-fatally-shoot-
man-who-attacked-officer-with-a-hatchet.html. 
8 Sarah Almukhtar et al., “Trail of Terror in the Manhattan Truck Attack,” New York Times, October 
31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/31/nyregion/manhattan-truck-attack.html. 
9 Benjamin Mueller, William K. Rashbaum, and Al Baker, “Terror Attack Kills 8 and Injures 11 in 
Manhattan,” New York Times, October 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/nyregion/police-
shooting-lower-manhattan.html. 
xix 
B. NYPD UNITS AND POLICY 
The NYPD has numerous assets involved in the policing of political 
demonstrations. These include basic patrol units, advanced specialty units, and 
administrative support units. This thesis outlines what each unit’s duties and 
responsibilities are and what it does during a political demonstration. The thesis then 
discusses what constitutes the NYPD’s policies, including the Police Academy curriculum, 
Activity Log inserts, and Patrol Guide procedures. The most important policies for this 
thesis include rapid mobilization, active shooter protocols, Handschu guidelines, and the 
use of force. The Handschu guidelines, which stem from case law, determine how the 
NYPD conducts investigations of political organizations.10 
C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Overall, the research concluded that the NYPD is fit to handle demonstrations and 
terror attacks. The research identified numerous areas that could be improved to further 
strengthen current policy: 
1. Regular patrol personnel who handle political demonstrations need the 
same disorder control training that specialty units receive. The researcher 
created an updated policy for how patrol personnel should initially handle 
political demonstrations.  
2. The Operations Database must be rebuilt as a user-friendly tool, rather 
than a record. Operations Unit personnel and supervisors in the field need 
to open a dialogue about what information could be useful about a specific 
demonstration. 
 
10 New York City Police Department, Command Operations: Guidelines for Uniformed Members of 
the Service Conducting Investigations Involving Political Activities, Patrol Guide Procedure No. 212-72 
(New York: New York City Police Department, 2018), 24. 
xx 
3. With the NYPD’s shift to a more community-orientated strategy, all 
officers who interact with the community on a regular basis need to learn 
the Handschu guidelines and how they operate.  
4. The NYPD’s cell phone is a powerful tool for officers. Law enforcement 
personnel need to remain vigilant and avoid being distracted by the 
phones, realizing the repercussions of such distractions.  
5. Policies regarding fire and body-worn cameras need to be reevaluated to 
include the content discussed in this thesis.  
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As the 2020 and 2024 U.S. presidential elections approach, an uptick in political 
protests is inevitable. Law enforcement agencies must fully prepare to police these political 
protests as well as secure them from any potential terrorist activity. Recent terrorist attacks, 
such as the vehicle ramming attack in Charlottesville, Virginia, and on West Street in New 
York City, have demonstrated the forms of violence facing law enforcement at political 
protests. 
One of the significant strengths of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) 
is its sheer size, nearing approximately 36,000 uniformed officers.1 A police department 
the size of some countries’ standing armies does not operate flawlessly. Political protests 
range from dozens of people to hundreds of thousands. These larger demonstrations create 
numerous challenges for law enforcement. At the scene of larger protests, many different 
specialty units and bureaus respond, bringing together officers who have never worked, 
trained, or met before. This impromptu meeting can result in drastic operational and 
intelligence flaws, so every officer at the scene must know the roles these units and bureaus 
play to police a situation as effectively and efficiently as possible. If redundancies occur, 
the potential for error greatly increases. For instance, if a specific group of officers 
performed traffic duties rather than oversaw force protection (overall site security) as 
expected, it might create an opportunity for a nefarious actor to attack.  
Executive and frontline leadership play a critical role in how a protest is policed. 
These supervisors must oversee the construction and execution of an effective policing 
strategy. If any unforeseen events occur, such as a mass arrest situation or violent outbreak, 
supervisors must also have the wisdom, experience, and training to modify the plan 
accordingly. Likewise, they must know how to allocate their resources properly to achieve 
the highest level of order.  
 
1 “About NYPD,” New York City Police Department, accessed March 4, 2019, https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/nypd/about/about-nypd/about-nypd-landing.page. 
2 
In the months and weeks preceding the 2020 U.S. presidential election, the number 
of protests will likely intensify to a daily occurrence. Leadership must guard against 
complacency in policing these repeated protests and reinforce constant vigilance. Frontline 
supervisors who first respond to a “pop-up” demonstration must possess the knowledge to 
supervise and carry out the NYPD’s plan. These supervisors are responsible for setting the 
tone of the event: establishing that the police will maintain everyone’s safety and protect 
the public’s rights.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How are political protests most vulnerable to current terrorist attack trends, and is 
the New York City Police Department prepared for these styles of attack from an 
intelligence, site security, tactical, operational, and training perspective? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars use a variety of different frameworks to analyze terror attacks. From 
independent reviews, media accounts, and after-action reports, these tragic events are 
thoroughly examined. Nationwide, police departments have incorporated counterterrorism 
police work into their protocols. These counterterrorism fundamentals should be firmly 
cemented in an agency’s standard operating procedures for policing political protests. 
Preliminary research has not resulted in the discovery of any analysis of the NYPD’s 
strategy for policing political protests from a counterterrorism standpoint. Numerous media 
outlets have covered political protests and demonstrations with an emphasis on what the 
NYPD executed. This literature review first examines recent work on the link between 
terror events and large political protests and the challenges to law enforcement. Next, it 
reviews literature that highlights the importance of pre-event investigations of political 
organizations and intelligence, as well as the policing of mass gatherings. 
3 
1. Recent Terror Events and Large Political Protests 
The final report of the events in Charlottesville, Virginia, by Hunton & Williams 
LLP illustrates the failures of law enforcement from a tactical and intelligence framework.2 
The report has numerous sub-sections entitled “What Went Wrong.” One of the sections 
outlines how the Charlottesville Police Department neither sought input from other law 
enforcement entities that have previously policed protests comparable to the “Unite the 
Right” event nor provided its members with adequate training or necessary intelligence 
about the event.3 Multiple news outlets provided media coverage and supplemental 
information about the extent of the destruction.  
In 2014, Major Stephen Geron of the Dallas Police Department completed his 
Naval Postgraduate School thesis entitled “21st Century Strategies for Policing Protest: 
What Major Cities’ Responses to the Occupy Movement Tell Us about the Future of Police 
Response to Public Protest.”4 Major Geron conducted a case study of four U.S. cities’ 
responses to the “Occupy Wall Street” movement. Geron selected New York City to study 
and explained that the NYPD had the ability to use officers from different precincts without 
a spike in overall crime occurring. The Occupy protest in New York City was, for the most 
part, a planned event centralized at Zuccotti Park. Hundreds of officers had already been 
dedicated to policing and monitoring the group. This plan considered whether protestors 
had decided to march or demonstrate at any other location throughout the city. This thesis 
includes a similar researching strategy for policing unplanned or “pop-up” demonstrations. 
Geron concludes that the NYPD “placed an emphasis on intelligence collection, in keeping 
with their [sic] anti-terror stance in the wake of September 11.”5 This thesis explores 
specifically what such an anti-terror stance encompasses at political demonstrations 
 
2 Hunton & Williams, Final Report: Independent Review of the 2017 Protest Events in Charlottesville, 
Virginia (Richmond, VA: Hunton & Williams, 2017), https://www.huntonak.com/images/content/3/4/v4/
34613/final-report-ada-compliant-ready.pdf. 
3 Hunton & Williams.  
4 Stephen Max Geron, “21st Century Strategies for Policing Protest: What Major Cities’ Responses to 
the Occupy Movement Tell U.S. about the Future of Police Response to Public Protest” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2014). 
5 Geron. 
4 
whereas Geron focused on the overall police response with anti-terror tactics being 
somewhat incorporated. 
In an article, author Michael T. Heaney studied multiple protests in 2017 on the 
National Mall in Washington, DC.6 This study shows how crowded political protests can 
really become. Four of the featured events comprised an attendance of over 10,000 
participants.7 Heaney concludes that the election of President Trump was a large 
motivating factor for protest preparedness by the “liberal-progressive-democrats.”8 He 
further surmises that President Trump’s tenure as president will be an interesting time for 
protests and social movements.9 
Authors Gloria Boone, Jane Secci, and Linda Gallant discussed how the 2016 
election of President Trump led to a swell in the number of physical political protests and 
active resistance in the online community.10 Some political activists used social media to 
display their thoughts and feelings as well as coordinate physical demonstrations. The 
writers also reviewed the 2017 Women’s March and Black Lives Matter. The authors 
described what signs protesters physically displayed during the events, including many that 
were anti–President Trump.11 This article further reinforces the logic that law enforcement 
needs to be ready for the 2020 presidential election and the legions of protestors who will 
come with it. 
Further, Robert Futrell and Barbara Brents examined the threat of a terror attack by 
domestic protest groups in Nevada at a nuclear test site and waste repository.12 This article 
 
6 Michael T. Heaney, “Making Protest Great Again,” Contexts 17, no. 1 (February 2018): 42–47, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504218766550. 
7 Heaney. 
8 Heaney, 47. 
9 Heaney. 
10 Gloria M. Boone, Jane Secci, and Linda M. Gallant, “Resistance: Active and Creative Political 
Protest Strategies,” American Behavioral Scientist 62, no. 3 (March 2018): 353–74, https://doi.org/10.
1177/0002764217735623. 
11 Boone, Secci, and Gallant. 
12 Robert Futrell and Barbara G. Brents, “Protest as Terrorism?: The Potential for Violent Anti-Nuclear 
Activism,” American Behavioral Scientist 46, no. 6 (February 2003): 745–65, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0002764202239172. 
5 
draws similarities with New York City protests in that they occur at high-value locations 
(e.g., nuclear power plants vis-à-vis Times Square or the Brooklyn Bridge). The writers 
conclude that violence tends to occur at the onset or conclusion of a movement.13 A 
comparison once again can be drawn to presidential elections—at the beginning of 2016 
and toward the end of 2020. The article further surmises that three elements help keep the 
potential for attacks to a minimum: the group is mostly pacifist in nature; there is a positive 
relationship between protestors and the authorities; and protestors want to bear witness, 
which requires few protestors.14 When handling a political protest, the NYPD does attempt 
to create a relationship with the protestors to ensure peace, and this thesis discusses  
that relationship.  
2. Investigation of Political Organizations and Pre-Protest Intelligence 
An investigation into specific groups provides the police department with the 
information needed to decide how many officers and what type of additional police 
resources are needed when groups decide to protest. Likewise, these investigations also aid 
in the discovery of whether a particular group has violent or terroristic tendencies. But a 
1971 class-action lawsuit, Handschu vs. New York City Police Department, in the U.S. 
Southern District of New York challenged the police department’s legal authority to 
investigate political and religious organizations.15 This lawsuit resulted in the creation of 
the “Handschu guidelines.”16 The events of September 11, 2001, prompted a change to 
these guidelines to aid the NYPD in its never-ending fight to prevent future acts of 
terrorism.17 Similarly, in 2011, a case was filed to investigate whether the NYPD had 
violated the Handschu doctrine in its surveillance of the Muslim community. This case is 
 
13 Futrell and Brents. 
14 Futrell and Brents. 
15 David Kimball-Stanley, “Settling for More: The NYPD’s New Oversight Deal,” Lawfare (blog), 
March 8, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/settling-more-nypds-new-oversight-deal. 
16 Handschu vs. Police Dep’t of City of New York (S.D.N.Y. 2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
doi/downloads/pdf/2016/Oct16/handschu-federal-decision.pdf. 
17 Handschu v. Special Services Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), https://law.justia.com/
cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/273/327/2340064/. 
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known as Raza vs. New York City.18 In 2016, the New York City Department of 
Investigation released a report that explored whether the NYPD had been adhering to the 
Handschu guidelines.19 This report focused on the investigative function rather than the 
policing of specific events.20 This report identified the extent to which the guidelines 
handcuff the NYPD from properly policing political protests.21  
In another analysis, Dr. Erik Dahl explored how the NYPD’s Intelligence Division 
performs its counterterrorism mission.22 Dahl discusses the Handschu guidelines and how 
senior NYPD officials believe the organization has operated within them.23 Regardless of 
whether the NYPD is interested in a political organization or a religious group, it must 
comply within the Handschu case law. Maintaining the balance between a protester’s First 
Amendment rights and law enforcement’s vigilance in keeping the peace is a challenge. 
All NYPD officers should become familiar with the Handschu doctrine and its importance 
in pre-operational intelligence for a demonstration. 
Nina Eggert discusses the correlation between police response and the behavior of 
the group protesting.24 Eggert analyzed the Brussels Police Department and its policing of 
protests over 10 years.25 She concluded that the Brussels Police Department relied heavily 
on past knowledge of particular protest groups in its decision-making process to determine 
 
18 “Landmark Settlement Protects American Muslims from Discriminatory NYPD Surveillance,” New 
York Civil Liberties Union, January 7, 2016, https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/landmark-settlement-
protects-american-muslims-discriminatory-nypd-surveillance. 
19 New York City Police Department Office of Inspector General, An Investigation of NYPD’s 
Compliance with Rules Governing Investigations of Political Activity (New York: New York City 
Department of Investigation, 2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/pdf/oig_intel_
report_823_final_for_release.pdf. 
20 New York City Police Department Office of Inspector General. 
21 New York City Police Department, Command Operations: Guidelines for Uniformed Members of 
the Service Conducting Investigations Involving Political Activities, Patrol Guide Procedure No. 212-72 
(New York: New York City Police Department, 2018). 
22 Erik J. Dahl, “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: The New York Police Department Model,” 
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 9, no. 2 (2014): 81–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/
18335330.2014.940815. 
23 Dahl. 
24 Nina Eggert et al., “Preparing for Action: Police Deployment Decisions for Demonstrations,” 
Policing and Society 28, no. 2 (2018): 137–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1147565. 
25 Eggert et al. 
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how many officers would respond and whether any specialized equipment would be 
ordered.26 Eggert further articulates that proper planning and intelligence are vital for 
properly policing an event.  
3. Tactical Policing of Soft Targets and Mass Gatherings 
The Department of Homeland Security has recently published reports discussing 
law enforcement’s strategy at populous and soft target locations.27 These reports examine 
why these types of events have an increased vulnerability to a terrorist event. These reports 
discuss tactics to thwart a potential terror attack from a pre-operational and operational 
perspective. One of the reports contained in the “First Responder’s Toolbox” features 
protests, rallies, and demonstrations.28 This report discusses the difficulty of planning these 
unique events from a security perspective and their attractiveness as a target. The section 
on protests and demonstrations takes up a brief portion of the report. This thesis elaborates 
on policing of such events. Vigilance is a common theme in these reports, further 
underscoring that safety is a shared responsibility among everyone attending protests.29 
The reports provide specific tips for event participators but does not address the law 
enforcement mindset. 
In this context, Tore Bjoro discusses how counterterrorism and crime prevention 
run parallel.30 One of Bjoro’s sections discusses the protection of vulnerable targets:  
 
26 Eggert et al. 
27 Department of Homeland Security, Soft Targets and Crowded Places Security Plan Overview 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/DHS-Soft-Target-Crowded-Place-Security-Plan-Overview-052018-508_0.pdf. 
28 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, First Responder’s Toolbox: Planning and Preparedness 
Can Promote an Effective Response to a Terrorist Attack at Open-Access Events (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/
firstresponderstoolbox/First-Responders-Toolbox---Planning-Promotes-Effective-Response-to-Open-
Access-Events.pdf. 
29 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Security of Soft Targets and Crowded Places—
Resource Guide (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/Soft_Targets_Crowded%20Places_Resource_Guide_042018_508.pdf. 
30 Tore Bjørgo, “Counter-Terrorism as Crime Prevention: A Holistic Approach,” Behavioral Sciences 
of Terrorism and Political Aggression 8, no. 1 (2016): 25–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2015.
1108352. 
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Some potential terrorist targets are especially attractive to terrorists because 
of what they represent (e.g. embassies, government buildings, symbols of 
“the system”) or because of the major adverse effects an attack could cause 
(e.g. on air traffic or other important infrastructure, or how many people 
might be hurt).31  
Protests may be held in locations that are highly sensitive. For example, the Occupy Wall 
Street movement marched to Times Square and blocked the Brooklyn Bridge.32 Bjoro’s 
conclusions further substantiates the concept that demonstrations represent an attractive 
target for terrorist activity.  
But such events may call for special tactics. In early 2017, authors Chad Whelan 
and Adam Molnar published an article discussing hard and soft police tactics.33 The authors 
conducted a case study on the 2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane to examine how the police 
maintained order for the event. The article outlines how hard police tactics involve 
intelligence gathering and typical counterterrorism techniques, such as target hardening 
and a large police response to any unrest.34 Soft target tactics include relationship building 
with protest groups and limiting the number of visible officers with high-level personal 
protective police equipment so as not to agitate the crowd.35 The authors conclude, “There 
is no standard template for securing political events.”36 Political protests incorporate a large 
number of variables, many of which are difficult to predict. Knowing the level of 
compassion or passion an individual would have for an issue being protested is a difficult 
task for police. This article provides background regarding hard and soft police tactics. The 
tactics discussed in conjunction with the NYPD’s approach help to identify best practices.  
 
31 Bjørgo. 
32 “Hundreds Arrested after Protest on Brooklyn Bridge,” National Public Radio, October 1, 2011, 
https://www.npr.org/2011/10/01/140983353/about-500-arrested-after-protest-on-brooklyn-bridge. 
33 Chad Whelan and Adam Molnar, “Policing Political Mega-Events through ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Tactics: 
Reflections on Local and Organisational Tensions in Public Order Policing,” Policing and Society 29, no. 1 
(2019): 85–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2017.1282481. 
34 Whelan and Molnar. 
35 Whelan and Molnar. 
36 Whelan and Molnar. 
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research used a case study and policy analysis methodology. The case studies 
included numerous recent terror attacks, such as the Chelsea bombing, the Queens hatchet 
attack, and the Westside Highway attack. An analysis of prominent political protests, 
including those in Charlottesville, Virginia, and the yellow jacket protests in France, 
identifies trends and examines the potential for a terror attack at a political protest. This 
phase of the research relied mainly on after-action reports and media coverage of the 
events, including video coverage whenever possible.  
Additional guidelines and policy changes in the NYPD Patrol Guide, especially in 
the area of policing political protests, follow directly from the analysis. This thesis argues 
that current layers of information sharing and training should be expanded to fit the needed 
policy changes to ensure the highest level of efficiency. Large urban law enforcement 
agencies world-wide can position to adopt the expanded NYPD strategy or modify it 
accordingly, depending on the size of the agency. An additional result is uncovering 
whether political protests are a growing phenomenon and whether a particular style of 
attack manifests as the greatest threat to a political protest. 
Because formal documentation of the duties and responsibilities of specific NYPD 
units is scarce or does not exist, a formal Institutional Review Board determination was 
submitted. The Institutional Review Board found that these interviews did not fall under 
human subject research and were exempt. This author is in a position to speak with various 
members of these units pertaining to this information, anticipating that if these 
conversations are needed, officers will request anonymity based on the policing culture of 
the NYPD. Ultimately, the research unearthed sufficient source material, so formal 
interviews were not needed. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW  
Event analysis offers an intelligence, tactical, site security, leadership, and 
operational framework. A policy analysis of the NYPD’s protocols for policing political 
protest follows the case study chapter. Then, the thesis turns to flaws in the vast number of 
NYPD standard operating procedures (e.g., the Patrol Guide). Finally, the researcher 
10 
provides suggestions for how to fix vulnerabilities by creating new policies and training or 
by supplementing existing policy.  
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II. PROMINENT POLITICAL PROTESTS AND  
RECENT TERROR ATTACKS 
This chapter focuses on five events to analyze whether the issues that the police 
faced pose a high-level threat to political protests. All of the events analyzed gained 
national media attention, capturing images, videos, and a synthesis of the event for future 
demonstrators and terrorists to study. In all these events, someone was either critically 
injured or died. The chief vulnerabilities from each of the events are discussed and 
recommendations provided in Chapter V. 
The case studies of the five events have been further broken down into two sections: 
political demonstrations and terror attacks in New York City. This separation provides a 
wider perspective and aids in a more comprehensive analysis. All the cases, except for the 
yellow jacket demonstrations, discuss the background of the attacker. In this way, each 
case provides further background for the Handschu guidelines and their application for the 
NYPD, which is discussed in Chapter IV. New York City stands as an attractive target 
because of the history of past terror events as well as being the most populous city in the 
United States.37  
A. POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS 
Two political demonstrations are discussed and analyzed in this section: the Unite 
the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, and the yellow jacket protests throughout 
France. Each demonstration is broken into two segments: 1) background and timeline and 
2) law enforcement analysis.  
1. Unite the Right Rally 
This section breaks down the events of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, 
Virginia. During this demonstration, a counter protester lost her life in a vehicle  
ramming attack. 
 
37 Bjørgo, “Counter-Terrorism as Crime Prevention.” 
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a. Background and Timeline 
The Unite the Right rally was held in Charlottesville, Virginia, on the weekend of 
August 11–12, 2017. The rally protested the City of Charlottesville’s decision to take down 
a statue of Robert E. Lee in one of the municipality’s parks and sell it.38 Jason Kessler, a 
pro-white activist and Charlottesville resident, organized the rally, which attracted such 
alt-right groups as neo-Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan.39  
On Friday, August 11, at approximately 9:00 p.m., a group of nearly 250 supporters 
of the rally marched throughout the University of Virginia’s campus in Charlottesville.40 
Marchers, mostly white males, lit torches, chanting rally cries of “you will not replace us!” 
and “Jews will not replace us!”41 The group proceeded from Nameless Field to a statue of 
Thomas Jefferson, the founder of the school. There, they were met by a group of counter-
protesting students of mixed race who surrounded the circular statue. This meeting 
ultimately led to violence as only one University of Virginia (UVA) police officer had been 
assigned near the statue.42 Eventually, the UVA police department asked for assistance.43 
The result of the march was one arrest and multiple people treated for exposure to pepper 
spray.44 This clash was a foreshadowing of the next day’s events. The path of the march is 
further illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
38 Dara Lind, “Unite the Right, the Violent White Supremacist Rally in Charlottesville, Explained,” 
Vox, August 12, 2017, https://www.vox.com/2017/8/12/16138246/charlottesville-nazi-rally-right-uva. 
39 Lind. 
40 Joe Heim, “How a Rally of White Nationalists and Supremacists at the University of Virginia 




43 Pierre Thomas and Bill Hutchinson, “Hate Crime Charges Filed in Fatal Charlottesville Car Attack 
Case,” ABC News, June 27, 2018, https://abcnews.go.com/US/hate-crime-charges-filed-fatal-car-attack-
charlottesville/story?id=56204308. 
44 Hunton & Williams, Final Report, 119. 
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Figure 1. Path of Marchers at UVA45 
On Saturday, August 12, the rally was scheduled to be held in Emancipation Park 
from noon until 5:00 p.m., but participants started appearing hours before then. Participants 
and counter-protesters came with banners, shields, and clubs, and some even arrived with 
handguns and rifles, as Virginia is an open-carry state.46 The Charlottesville Police 
Department (CPD) and the Virginia State Police (VSP) were present at the park but not on 
Market Street, one of the four blocks surrounding the park. Market Street would become 
the site of the first physical confrontations between the two groups, who exchanged 
barrages of punches, bottles, and water balloons filled with ink. A small number of people 
were injured and arrested at this point.47 
 
45 Source: Hunton & Williams, 117. 
46 Heim, “‘Tragic, Tragic Weekend.’” 
47 Heim. 
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Before the event could begin, state officials declared it an unlawful assembly.48 
Attendees began to disperse with the rally participants marching away from Emancipation 
Park without being followed by counter-protesters. Attendees headed north to McIntire 
Park—approximately one mile from Emancipation Park—where the City of Charlottesville 
attempted to move the rally. Earlier that week, a judge had ordered the city not to move the 
rally to McIntire Park and to allow it to take place in the original park with the statue of 
Robert E. Lee.49  
At approximately 1:41 p.m., rally attendee James Alex Fields Jr. drove his Dodge 
Challenger at a high rate of speed into a crowd of pedestrians and two other vehicles.50 
Fields then placed the vehicle into reverse and fled for approximately one block. Fields 
then turned his vehicle around and fled the location. Police apprehended him a couple of 
blocks away. Fields had killed Heather Heyer, a counter-protester, before rescue resources 
could arrive.51 Figure 2 shows the carnage that Fields caused. Charlottesville Fire 
Department rendered aid and transported 20 patients.52 The block where this attack took 
place was at the intersection of Water and 4th Street. Immediately after the attack, 
approximately 400–500 counter-protesters massed in the intersection south of 
Emancipation and McIntire Park. An eye witness, Emily Gorcenski, stated she had been 
15 feet away from the attack, and her original thought was that Fields was going to exit his 
car and open fire on the counter-protesters.53  
 
48 Heim. 
49 Hunton & Williams, Final Report, 155. 
50 Hunton & Williams, 144. 
51 Hunton & Williams, 145. 
52 Hunton & Williams, 145. 
53 Hunton & Williams, 144. 
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Figure 2. Image of Fields Driving into Counter-Protestors54 
Later that evening, a VSP helicopter policing the event crashed, killing VSP 
Troopers Lieutenant H. Jay Cullen and Trooper-Pilot Berke M. M. Bates.55 These troopers 
had been providing aerial coverage of the event but then were reposted to watch over the 
motorcade bringing the governor of Virginia into Charlottesville.56 All VSP personnel 
immediately responded to the crash site, essentially abandoning the command center.57 
Had the two tragic events of that day happened in reverse order, the response from VSP to 
the ramming attack would have been delayed.58 Nonetheless, three people died as a result 
of the Unite the Right rally.  
 
54 Source: Thomas and Hutchinson, “Hate Crime Charges Filed.” 
55 Hunton & Williams, Final Report, 147. 
56 Hunton & Williams, 147. 
57 Hunton & Williams, 147. 
58 Hunton & Williams, 147. 
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b. Law Enforcement Analysis 
The official after-action report concluded that there were 10 categories of errors.59 
These blunders span not only law enforcement but also city officials and the public. This 
section highlights the law enforcement failures.  
University of Virginia Police declined the assistance of the CPD twice during the 
afternoon of August 11 before the torch march.60 Moreover, UVA did not ask for assistance 
from the CPD until after the disorder and violence erupted.61 The campus did receive 
intelligence that the march was going to take place and that the proper precautions were 
necessary, but the UVA hierarchy did not want to saturate the area with police officers to 
appear overly oppressive.62 Not having the appropriate number of police resources on the 
campus leading up to the torch march was a failure. Having both rally marchers and 
counter-protesters observe the lack of law enforcement invigorated the crowds for the 
larger demonstration the following day.63 
The report concludes that the CPD had not trained its officers in how to properly 
police such an event. CPD officers had not been trained on such topics as crowd dispersal, 
moving as a group in formation, and using non-lethal weapons.64 The lack of knowledge 
resulted in officers being unsure of their actions during the rally.65 The CPD implemented 
a strategy of “soft” uniforms: officers wore their everyday police uniforms as not to incite 
the crowd further.66 When the violence broke out, however, CPD officers donned their riot 
gear. For some of the officers, August 12 was the first time they had ever worn riot gear.67 
If officers are donning this style of equipment for the first time, it means that they have 
 
59 Hunton & Williams, 153. 
60 Hunton & Williams, 189. 
61 Hunton & Williams, 190. 
62 Hunton & Williams, 158. 
63 Hunton & Williams, 158. 
64 Hunton & Williams, 153. 
65 Hunton & Williams, 153. 
66 Hunton & Williams, 160. 
67 Hunton & Williams, 154. 
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never had any type of formal training while wearing it. This detail shows an absolute police 
training failure in that police officers had never gone through simulations to understand 
how operating with this equipment in real life would feel.  
Rally goers and counter-protesters both came to the rally with shields, batons, 
pistols, long guns, and—most importantly—a strong ideology. People on opposite sides of 
such a politically polarizing issue in which violence has already occurred should not be 
allowed to stand face to face, especially with tools of violence in their hands. One of the 
more catastrophic flaws of law enforcement on August 12 was allowing the groups to 
combine. In one instance, the police themselves merged the groups. After declaring the 
rally an unlawful assembly, the protesters and counter-protesters evacuated Emancipation 
Park. The CPD allowed attendees to exit the park haphazardly without attempting to 
separate the groups, essentially allowing them to collide.68 Law enforcement also permitted 
the groups to leave via Market Street, which had no pre-positioned law enforcement at the 
time. The bulk of law enforcement massed inside Emancipation Park behind metal 
barricades. Having resources on the outside of the park would have deterred violence and 
could have separated the two groups.69 
The ideology behind the Unite the Right rally was inherently violent. The City of 
Charlottesville had already lost one lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union 
involving the location of the rally and, thus, became too apprehensive and perhaps worried 
about lawsuits to cancel the event, which would have saved the lives of Heather Heyer and 
Troopers Cullen and Berke and stopped 20 others from being injured. The failures that day 
fall not solely on the leadership of the various police departments but also with the political 
leadership in Charlottesville.  
There was no law enforcement in the intersection where the attack took place. 
Demonstrations can draw crowds of people to a confined area, which this event showed 
makes an attractive target.70 Demonstrators can become mobile and march anywhere they 
 
68 Hunton & Williams, 159. 
69 Hunton & Williams, 159. 
70 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, First Responder’s Toolbox. 
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choose, granted they do not break any laws. This mobility and ability to regroup poses a 
challenge for law enforcement.71 At these types of large demonstrations, no small group 
should be left unattended.  
The report concludes that certain elements of the protest were handled correctly, 
the sentiment being that they could have been worse. For example, numerous individuals 
present at the protest carried firearms, but no one was shot during the Unite the Right 
rally.72 Moreover, there was no critical property or infrastructural damage.73 Nevertheless, 
the mentality that it could have been worse is in itself a failure. The event was littered with 
flaws as previously shown. Law enforcement entities nationwide must understand these 
failures and prevent them from occurring in the future.  
2. Yellow Jacket Protests  
This section discusses the events of the gilets jaunes (yellow jacket) protests that 
became a national phenomenon in France. Clashes between protesters and law enforcement 
became common place during the demonstrations.  
a. Background and Timeline 
In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron signed a bill raising taxes on diesel 
fuel to help France become more environmentally friendly.74 This new law sparked outrage 
among the French population, especially motorists who lived in remote parts of rural 
France and faced long daily commutes.75 This protest led to a social movement that 
snowballed into a larger middle-class group that was anti-Macron.  
The protesters mostly demonstrated by blocking roads and roundabouts. They wore 
the yellow jackets, the safety vests that all French motorists must have in their vehicles by 
 
71 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team. 
72 Hunton & Williams, Final Report, 151. 
73 Hunton & Williams, 151. 
74 Jake Cigainero, “Who Are France’s Yellow Vest Protesters, and What Do They Want?,” National 




law.76 Yet, in contrast to the safety idea, protesters gradually became more violent, clashing 
with police more frequently. Protesters vandalized iconic locations such as the Champs 
Elysees, the Arc de Triomphe, and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.77 Likewise, they 
also lit garbage cans on fire, looted shops, and vandalized buildings. The number of 
demonstrators reached as high as 300,000 in fall 2018.78 Demonstrators in the spring of 
2019 dropped to approximately 40,000. In response to such a nationwide outcry, President 
Macron amended parts of the fuel bill, but the end of March 2019 marked the 20th 
consecutive weekend of protests.79 Thus, this social movement increasingly threatens 
social order in France as these protests are still occurring as of January 2020.80 
Demonstrations have resulted in numerous injuries to both the protester and police 
sides. As of December 2018, 10 people have died as a direct result of the protest.81 Often, 
clashes involve French police using a great deal of force including tear gas, rubber bullets, 
and water cannons. French police frequently cordon off areas to prevent protesters from 
vandalizing the location, including the Champs Elysees.82 Figure 3 depicts a clash between 




78 Elizabeth Pineau and Laurence Frost, “‘Yellow Vest’ Numbers Down in 20th Week of French 
Protests,” Reuters, March 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-protests-idUSKCN1RB0OX. 
79 Pineau and Frost. 
80 Sudip Kar-Gupta, “Clashes Break Out at Paris Protest against Pension Reform,” Reuters, January 4, 
2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-protests-pensions-idUSKBN1Z30G1. 
81 Antoine Cruin and Laura Smith-Spark, “10th Death Linked to France’s ‘Yellow Vest’ Protests,” 
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Figure 3. Police Clashing with Yellow Jacket Protestors83 
After the protests became popular at the end fall 2018, the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) released images on Twitter attacking the yellow jacket protests.84 The images, 
shown in Figure 4, contain a quote in Arabic that translates as follows: “Oh lone wolves, 
exploit the demonstrations and kill the unbelievers in France.”85 The images contain a 
vehicle with blood splattered on the hood and a hand holding a knife.86 ISIS was attempting 
to inspire an attack during these protests.  
 
83 Source: Euan McKirdy and Saskya Vandoorne, “France to Suspend Fuel Price Hike after ‘Yellow 
Vest’ Protests,” CNN, December 5, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/04/europe/france-yellow-vest-
protests-intl/index.html. 
84 Annabel Murphy, “ISIS Calls on Fanatics to Kill Unbelievers at French Fuel Protests,” The Sun 






Figure 4. ISIS Propaganda on Twitter87 
b. Law Enforcement Analysis 
In France, these protests occurred on a weekly basis but primarily on the weekends. 
Similarly, climate change demonstrations in New York City have become a recurring issue 
as of 2019.88 Police commanders must be cognizant of the energy that officers use when 
policing these groups. If the same groups of officers are constantly engaging in these 
physically and mentally draining demonstrations, problems will arise. Morale among the 
officers will diminish at a rapid pace, and their motivation to maintain the peace will 
evaporate. Police commanders need to ensure that as many officers as possible are trained 
in disorder techniques so that the same officers do not have to work these demonstrations 
every weekend. Clearly, ISIS is ready to take advantage of the frequent chaos at these 
 
87 Murphy. 
88 Anne Barnard, “Climate Change Protests: With Fake Blood, Extinction Rebellion Hits N.Y.,” New 
York Times, October 7, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/nyregion/extinction-rebellion-nyc-
protest.html. 
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demonstrations to carry out an attack. Officers need to be motivated and prepared to handle 
an attack if, unfortunately, one occurs. 
French police cordoned off certain areas so that protesters could not vandalize 
important landmarks. Part of Trump Tower in New York City (NYC), which has turned 
into a protest hotspot, serves as a public park. All individuals who enter the tower still need 
to undergo a level of screening, but demonstrators could enter under false pretenses and 
initiate a demonstration. Police commanders need to be cognizant of all frequent 
demonstration locations and ensure that their resources are deployed in the area.  
Larger urban police departments are adopting and implementing some level of the 
community policing model. This model attempts to use the community as a tool in the fight 
to quell crime and identify problems. Officers must be dedicated to outreach before a 
protest commences to gather as much intelligence as possible for the event, which helps 
police commanders make tactical decisions to maintain order and peace. The research for 
this case did not reveal whether the French police have implemented this tactic. 
B. NEW YORK CITY TERROR ATTACKS 
Three terror attacks that occurred in NYC are discussed in this section: the Chelsea 
bombing attack, the Queens hatchet attack, and the Westside Highway attack. Each case is 
broken into three segments: 1) background and timeline, 2) background of attacker, and 3) 
law enforcement analysis. 
1. Chelsea Bombing 
This section discusses the events of the Chelsea bombing attack. This attack 
spanned New York and New Jersey and involved the use of pressure cooker devices, pipe 
bombs, and firearms. 
a. Background and Timeline 
On September 17, 2016, Ahmad Khan Rahami placed a series of pressure cooker–
style improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in NYC and pipe bombs in New Jersey. 
Rahami’s first device was a pipe bomb that detonated at approximately 9:35 a.m. in a 
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garbage can at a charity race for U.S. Marine Corps.89 The race started late, which led to 
no one being in the vicinity of the device during the time of detonation. At approximately 
8:30 p.m., a pressure cooker device detonated inside a dumpster in the Chelsea 
neighborhood of Manhattan, injuring 31 people.90 The pressure cooker device had a cell 
phone trigger packed with ball bearings and steel nuts. Later that same night, a second, 
undetonated device was discovered a few blocks away by a homeless person rummaging 
through garbage. Figure 5 provides a map of where the devices were found in Manhattan. 
The next evening, police were involved in the detection of a backpack containing numerous 
pipe bombs in the vicinity of the Elizabeth, New Jersey, train station.91 Law enforcement 
was able to link the unexploded bomb in New York City and the pipe bombs in New Jersey 
through Rahami’s fingerprints.92  
 
Figure 5. Location of the Two Devices in Manhattan93 
 
89 “Ahmad Khan Rahami,” Counter Extremism Project, accessed February 27, 2020, https://www.
counterextremism.com/extremists/ahmad-khan-rahami. 
90 Counter Extremism Project.  
91 Counter Extremism Project.  
92 Counter Extremism Project.  
93 Source: “New York Bombs ‘Both Pressure Cookers,’” BBC News, September 19, 2016, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37402130. 
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At approximately 10:30 a.m. on September 19, local law enforcement discovered 
Rahami sleeping in a doorway at a bar in Linden, New Jersey.94 It was only when police 
officers tried to wake the man that they realized he resembled the suspect in a wanted poster 
for the attacks and ordered him to show his hands.95 At this time, Rahami shot one of the 
officers, striking him in the chest, which was protected by his bullet-proof vest.96 Rahami 
then fled the location, firing the handgun wildly.97 Police shot and captured Rahami shortly 
thereafter. Another officer suffered an injury from shattered glass during the gun fight that 
led to Rahami’s capture.98  
b. Background of Attacker 
Rahami was born in Afghanistan and first came to the United States in 1995.99 
Rahami traveled back to the Middle East for a year from 2013 to 2014, where he spent time 
in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, allegedly to visit his wife and family who were refugees 
living in Pakistan.100 When Rahami was apprehended, law enforcement personnel found 
paperwork on him including references to Anwar al-Awlaki—a leader for Al Qaeda whose 
preaching has been implicated in numerous terror plots nationwide, including the San 
Bernardino and Fort Hood attacks.101 Rahami was on the radar of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in 2014, but the background check concluded there were no ties to terrorism 
at the time. Rahami was not placed on a watch list, and he returned to the Middle East 
multiple times between 2014 and 2016.102 People speculate that Rahami radicalized 
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because of these overseas trips, becoming more religious, growing a beard, changing his 
wardrobe, and praying more frequently.  
c. Law Enforcement Response and Analysis 
The first device exploded in a trash receptacle. At highly populous events, law 
enforcement agencies must recognize that these closed items are a lucrative target to 
conceal an IED. Law enforcement in the area should have removed the trash receptacles or 
conducted continuous sweeps of them throughout the race to ensure no devices or 
suspicious material had been placed in one. This race benefitted military families, so it 
made an attractive target for Rahami, a chance to eliminate the infidels who had killed 
Muslims. 
Rahami traveled undetected between New York and New Jersey with the IEDs and 
possibly the pipe bombs. The criminal complaint filed by New York states that Rahami 
had traveled by vehicle through the Lincoln Tunnel between these states.103 One might 
speculate that Rahami chose to avoid public transportation to reduce the chance of being 
caught before the attack. Rahami did run the risk of being pulled over by law enforcement 
when traveling in a vehicle on surface streets. This behavior suggests that Rahami thought 
that law enforcement conducted enough counterterrorism efforts on public transportation 
not to risk using one of those services. 
The events at the military race and in Chelsea occurred in two different states. Law 
enforcement successfully linked the events through Rahami’s fingerprints in a short period. 
This coordination shows that the intelligence protocols in place functioned properly.  
2. Queens Hatchet Attack 
This section outlines the details of the Queens Hatchet attack. This event highlights 
the role of distraction for law enforcement in unpredictable scenarios.  
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a. Background and Timeline 
October 23, 2014, was a rainy day in the commercial district of Jamaica, Queens. 
Rookie NYPD police officers Kenneth Healy, Joseph Meeker, Taylor Kraft, and Peter 
Rivera were assigned to foot patrol in the area.104 Dominick Williams a freelance 
photographer, approached the four officers.105 Williams asked the officers to pose for a 
photo with him. As NYPD officers pose for pictures routinely, this request was by no 
means farfetched. The officers obliged the request and focused their attention on taking the 
picture. The officers did not know that Zale Thompson was looming near a bus stop 
overhang, stalking the officers, waiting for the opportune moment to strike.106 
Thompson charged the officers with a hatchet. Thompson struck Meeker in the arm 
and delivered a devastating blow to Healy, striking him in the head.107 The two other 
officers discharged their firearms, ending Thompson’s terror attack. Meeker suffered 
injuries to his arm and was discharged from the hospital later that afternoon. Healy was 
temporarily paralyzed and critically injured. Healy was released from the hospital two 
weeks after the attack but sustained a permanent injury.108 Figure 6 shows images of 
Thompson, his charging the officers, and the immediate aftermath of the attack.  
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Figure 6. Images of Zale Thompson Charging NYPD Officers  
and the Aftermath109 
b. Background of Attacker 
Zale Thompson was a self-radicalized Islamic extremist who had spent the weeks 
and months preceding the attack living in the online world reading jihadist material.110 
Thompson researched material related to ISIS, Al Shabab, and Al Qaeda.111 Likewise, 
Thompson posted comments on various online platforms discussing the support of a violent 
jihad and his hatred for whites and Christians.112 NYPD detectives discovered a manifesto 
on his personal computer in which he discusses his hatred of the government and his desire 
to attack government workers.113 Altogether, Thompson had conducted 277 online 
searches related to the attack, searching such topics as “jihad” and “lone wolf.”114 
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Thompson was discharged from the Navy in 2003.115 Thompson had been arrested six 
times previously in Oxnard, California, but never in NYC.116 His family described him as 
a recluse who had mental health issues.117  
c. Law Enforcement Analysis 
When officers pose for photos with tourists and other members of the community, 
it helps to foster a positive relationship with the neighborhood. However, it can also distract 
officers and cause them to lose sight of the overall scene. This acute focus is similar to how 
officers at the scene of a protest become overly engaged with the protesters and neglect the 
entirety of their surroundings.  
The concept of an attacker with an edged weapon disguising oneself as a protester 
at a demonstration is an alarming one. Edged weapons can be easily concealed, allowing 
the attacker to wait for the precise moment when law enforcement is not visible or in 
proximity to inflict critical damage. A terrorist might use the loud noise of chants or rally 
cries to hide the relative quietness of a stabbing or slashing. Multiple targets could be struck 
before law enforcement or the group around a victim would know that a terror attack was 
underway. Officers must always be vigilant and careful about allowing someone to come 
into their immediate personal space.  
3. Westside Highway Ramming Attack 
This section outlines the events of the ramming attack that took place on NYC’s 
Westside Highway, which killed multiple people. This section further portrays that vehicle 
ramming attacks are becoming more common.  
a. Background and Timeline 
The Westside Highway bike path in New York City was certainly the most frightful 
place to be on Halloween 2017. Sayfullo Saipov rented a pick-up truck at a Home Depot 
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in Passaic, New Jersey.118 He traveled into Manhattan via the George Washington Bridge 
approximately 40 minutes later, continuing south down the West Side Highway.119 Saipov 
entered the bicycle lane, which runs north and south on the west side of West Street at 
Houston Street, approximately 20 minutes after entering New York.120 He traveled 
southbound, killing eight people and injuring 11.121 The attack ended outside Stuyvesant 
High School, where Saipov crashed into a school bus. Figure 7 illustrates the route he took 
down Westside Highway. He exited his vehicle with a pellet and paintball gun, shouting 
“Allahu akbar,” which translates to “God is Great.” NYPD Officer Ryan Nash, who was 
in the vicinity of the attack on an unrelated call for service, heard the commotion and ran 
toward Saipov. Nash discharged his firearm, striking Saipov in the stomach, wounding 
him, and ending the attack.  
 
Figure 7. Map of the Westside Highway Attack122 
 
118 Sarah Almukhtar et al., “Trail of Terror in the Manhattan Truck Attack,” New York Times, October 
31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/31/nyregion/manhattan-truck-attack.html. 
119 Almukhtar et al. 
120 Almukhtar et al. 
121 Benjamin Mueller, William K. Rashbaum, and Al Baker, “Terror Attack Kills 8 and Injures 11 in 
Manhattan,” New York Times, October 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/nyregion/police-
shooting-lower-manhattan.html. 
122 Source: “Truck Driver Kills Eight in Lower Manhattan Terrorist Attack,” Levant News, November 
1, 2017, https://the-levant.com/truck-driver-kills-eight-in-lower-manhattan-terrorist-attack/. 
30 
b. Background of Attacker 
Saipov was an immigrant from Uzbekistan who moved to Ohio in 2010.123 Saipov 
then moved to Florida, where he worked as a truck driver, before ultimately settling in New 
Jersey. There, he worked as an Uber driver, but the company received no negative safety 
reports against him.124 However, Saipov was on law enforcement’s radar through an 
unrelated terror investigation, which was unfounded. As a sign of his commitment to 
radical Islam, Saipov requested the ISIS flag be hung in his hospital room because he was 
proud of what he had done.125 
c. Law Enforcement and Analysis 
As seen in New York and around the world, vehicles of all sizes have the potential 
to become deadly weapons in a terrorist’s plot.126 Yet law enforcement agencies can harden 
specific locations. Sports venues, airports, museums, and numerous other high-density 
locations have numerous counterterrorism mitigation tools in place. These devices include 
cement bollards, closed circuit television, metal barriers, and metal detectors. 
Unfortunately, on the day of the attack, there were too few mitigation devices to prevent 
the attack. As a result of Saipov’s attack, cement barriers were placed along the bike path 
on the Westside Highway, as seen in Figure 8, making it impossible for another attack to 
occur.127  
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Figure 8. Image of Cement Barriers Placed along the Westside 
Highway after the Attack128 
C. SYNTHESIS  
Through the analysis of the five events, numerous lessons can be learned in the 
application to political demonstrations. The vehicle ramming attacks in both NYC and 
Charlottesville would have been almost impossible to stop once commenced. The two 
looming failures were the lack of bollards in NYC and the lack of law enforcement in the 
area in Charlottesville. The analysis shows the trend of attackers looking for little bangs as 
opposed to big bangs, like on 9/11. Items in all of the events were easily obtainable and 
cheap, as shown with the hatchet in Queens and the pipe bombs and pressure cooker 
devices in Chelsea. The terrorism component exacerbates the challenges that law 
enforcement faces during political demonstrations. 
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III. POLICE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES 
This chapter discusses the numerous units that compose the NYPD. Like the federal 
government, the NYPD has myriad resources at its disposal that aid in the policing of 
political demonstrations.129 The units discussed in this chapter have been identified for 
their potential in policing a political demonstration both physically and in a support 
capacity. The aim is to synthesize the duties and responsibilities of each unit to highlight 
its role in political demonstrations, for which specific policies are discussed in Chapter IV. 
Units are further categorized as either field or support units. Helping to clarify parts of this 
chapter, a summary of each rank within the NYPD appears in Appendix B. 
A. FIELD UNITS 
The units discussed in this section have the potential to be physically on scene of a 
political demonstration. The chapter begins with patrol officers and then discusses 
specialty units.  
1. Precinct Patrol Personnel 
Patrol officers are the frontline contact officers in the community. Officers respond 
to 9-1-1 calls and are assigned to specific details that occur within one’s precinct or patrol 
bureau. They are the first responding officers to pop-up protests or are assigned to planned 
demonstrations in conjunction with other various units. Officers are assigned to one of the 
three patrol platoons, each of which has a squad sergeant. Each platoon has three squads 
and is supervised by the platoon commander, who is a lieutenant. Police officers, sergeants, 
and lieutenants are used to police political demonstrations. 
Patrol officers are the first line of response. They are in regular patrol vehicles and 
answer 9-1-1 calls in a specific geographical area. Currently, this author is assigned to the 
Midtown Precinct North, which is a patrol command with officers assigned to site security 
at Trump Tower around the clock. At a planned demonstration, patrol officers are assigned 
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in the greatest number because they have basic training in crowd control. Patrol officers 
wear a police uniform with basic equipment, including a body-worn camera, handcuffs, a 
flashlight, a baton, a bullet-resistant vest, a firearm, and a conductive energy device—if 
properly trained to carry one. 
2. Neighborhood Coordination Officers 
Recently, the NYPD has gone through a fundamental police strategy change. This 
change lies both in philosophy and the deployment of resources. The tragic events 
involving Freddy Grey in Baltimore, Eric Garner in New York City, and Michael Brown 
in Ferguson, Missouri, have led to increased tensions between police officers and the public 
they serve. The NYPD implemented the neighborhood coordination officer (NCO) strategy 
to help ease these tensions and foster a positive relationship with the public to fight crime 
more effectively. 
Before the implementation of NCO police precincts, transit districts and police 
service areas (PSAs) were broken down into numerous sectors based on geographical size, 
population, and criminal activity of an area. With the NCO model, these sectors were 
dramatically reduced. For example, before the change to the NCO framework, Midtown 
Precinct North in Manhattan had 12 sectors, but since the change, it has five. This reduction 
in size allows a more intimate relationship with the community.  
Each sector has two dedicated NCOs whose sole mission is to work with the 
community to solve problems of all shapes and sizes. They do not answer traditional 9-1-1 
calls. In conjunction with NCOs, each sector has “steady sector” officers, who work daily 
in their dedicated sector and may not be used for any other police function within the 
precinct. These officers also spend two hours and 40 minutes each day interacting with the 
community they serve.  
3. Community Affairs Officers Assigned to Precincts 
Supplementing the NCOs are community affairs officers, who pre-date the NCO 
paradigm shift. These officers have a bond with the entire community, ranging from 
religious groups, to community leaders and politicians, to business owners. Depending on 
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the specific demographics of each precinct, community affairs officers have different 
responsibilities. These officers communicate with groups who wish to demonstrate and are 
involved in the permit for the demonstration. Developing relationships with the groups 
protesting is meant to promote peaceful demonstrations from all perspectives.130 These 
officers offer the first step in educating the public that political demonstrations are a type 
of soft target and that security is a joint responsibility.131 
4. Anti-crime Personnel Assigned to Precincts  
Anti-crime officers focus on proactive policing, operating in plain clothes (not in 
uniform) and focusing on felonious crimes in progress (e.g., burglaries and robberies). 
These officers do not answer calls for service, which is a reactive style of policing, and 
they typically work during hours that crime is the highest for their respective precinct. 
These officers are not typically assigned directly to police-specific demonstrations. They 
are notified of an event and may choose to conduct operations in the area due to the influx 
of population.  
5. Scooter Task Force, Patrol Bureau Manhattan South 
These officers operate on two-wheel scooters and have received extensive training 
in effectively negotiating traffic at an increased pace. These officers are deployed 
throughout Patrol Bureau Manhattan South (PBMS) to help enforce Vision Zero initiatives, 
including issuing citations for failure to yield to pedestrians and improper turns through 
intersections.132 At the scene of a protest, these officers follow groups who decide to march. 
These duties include escorting the group from all angles as well as creating a safe passage 
for the group to traverse an intersection. 
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6. Strategic Response Group 
The Strategic Response Group (SRG) consists of specialty trained officers who 
respond to specific calls in progress as well as remain ubiquitous. These officers 
traditionally do not answer 9-1-1 calls. SRG officers respond to mobilizations and civil 
disorder and are tasked with maintaining order by implementing crime and crowd control 
strategies.133 Table 1 lists the devices used by SRG officers. 
Table 1. Strategic Response Group Equipment134 
Traditional Intrusive 
Helmets and Protective Equipment Irritants 
Batons Less Lethal Grenades and Pepper Ball Systems 
Loud Speakers and Bullhorns Millimeter Sound Wave Systems 
Fire Suppression Devices  Conductive Energy Devices (TASERS) 
Flex Cuffs  
 
Like the Critical Response Command, the SRG deploys to vulnerable locations to 
further project a high level of police presence besides responding to any catastrophic event 
citywide. SRG officers operate 24 hours per day in every borough.135 SRG training school 
lasts approximately 20 days.136 Officers are trained in disorder control, long guns, 
hazardous materials, and victim extraction at catastrophic events. SRG officers collaborate 
with the NYPD’s Emergency Service Unit, which operates in a similar fashion to 
traditional SWAT teams.137 If a crime has been committed at a demonstration, and the 
executive in charge orders arrests be made, the SRG would effect the arrests. SRG 
executives frequently conduct mobilization drills to keep personnel vigilant. 
 
133 New York City Police Department Strategic Response Group, “NYPD Strategic Response Group” 
(presentation, New York City Police Department, 2017). 
134 Adapted from New York City Police Department Strategic Response Group. 
135 New York City Police Department Strategic Response Group. 
136 New York City Police Department Strategic Response Group. 
137 New York City Police Department Strategic Response Group. 
37 
7. SRG Bicycle Unit 
These highly trained, highly visible officers are deployed for crowd management 
and, in some cases, parade escorts.138 Members of this unit work in conjunction with 
officers on foot. Officers on bicycle can redeploy or follow a march faster than officers on 
foot. The unit stresses a team mentality: no officer takes independent action. Officers are 
trained to use multiple formations to redirect or stop a crowd from moving.139 The bicycle 
is frequently used as a barrier. Officers are assigned specific roles within the platoon such 
as linebacker, point officer, and line officer.140 The following figure shows members of the 
team in formation.  
 
Figure 9. SRG Bicycle Unit Members141 
8. Disorder Control Unit 
This unit was created in the early 1990s in response to riots in Tompkins Square 
Park, Crown Heights, and Washington Heights.142 The mission of the unit is to assess how 
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the NYPD handles civil disorder.143 Members of the unit assist commanders in decision 
making regarding political demonstrations from operational, tactical, and logistical 
frameworks.144 Table 2 further elaborates these frameworks. The unit holds training 
sessions, mobilization drills, and tabletop exercises.145 The unit stresses protecting life and 
critical locations, restoring order, apprehending violators, and maintaining everyone’s 
constitutional rights.146 The NYPD credits the creation of the Disorder Control Unit with 
the absence of large-scale riots in the city. 
Table 2. DCU Considerations at Demonstrations147 
Operational Tactical Logistical 
• Devise a plan and ensure it 
is communicated throughout 
the chain of command. 
• Ensure all supervisors are 
briefed and updates are 
regularly provided. 
• Ensure all proper support 
units and resources are 
notified, available, or staged 
as appropriate. 
• Establish a relief plan with 
reserve officers. 
• Identify where arrests will 
be processed and the mass 
arrest plan is in effect. 
• Attempt liaison with group 
leaders to establish a 
working relationship, gather 
intelligence, and develop 
cooperation. 




proper level of force based 
on crowd dynamics and 
political considerations 
• Do not engage until 
adequate resources are 
available. 
• Contain/isolate v. disperse 
• Secure critical and sensitive 
locations. 
• Survey affected areas for 
debris. 
• Maintain high-ground 
observation. 
• Checkpoints to isolate 
affected area 
• Target crowd agitators 
where possible. 
• Team tactics—no 
independent actions 
• Span of control 
• Ensure appropriate and 
necessary equipment is 
readily available 
• Ensure appropriate and 
necessary personnel are 
readily available 
• Ensure appropriate and 
necessary vehicles are 
readily available 
• Mobile field forces? 
• Arrest teams? 
• Extraction teams? 
• Undercovers? 
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9. Emergency Service Unit 
When members of the public need help, they call the police. When police officers 
need help, they call the Emergency Service Unit (ESU). ESU officers are the most highly 
trained officers in the department, having completed a comprehensive nine-month school 
to hone their skills.148 ESU officers respond daily to calls for emotionally disturbed 
persons, evidence searches, ongoing scenes involving weapons, and car accidents in which 
a person is pinned inside a vehicle, just to name a few. ESU officers also conduct operations 
that other departments’ SWAT units handle. Typically, these officers are not assigned to a 
planned demonstration at the onset. They are made aware of the demonstration and respond 
to the scene when their assistance and expertise is needed.149  
10. ESU Canine 
Officers assigned to this unit perform regular patrol duties alongside a canine. 
These officers and canine partner may be assigned to numerous details in NYC including 
baseball games and concerts. Like regular ESU personnel, they are not assigned directly to 
a demonstration but are made aware of the event and respond if their skills are needed.150 
11. Aviation Unit 
Members assigned to the Aviation Unit conduct search and rescue operations, 
respond to the site of natural disasters, conduct counterterrorism and critical infrastructure 
site surveys, and assist patrol units in perpetrator searches.151 The NYPD Aviation Unit is 
the largest law enforcement unit of its kind in the region. The Aviation Unit works in 
conjunction with federal partners to aid during presidential visits to NYC. During a large 
demonstration, the Aviation Unit conducts crowd surveys to provide officers on the ground 
with proper intelligence to police the group successfully.152 They also monitor the dispersal 
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of demonstrations to ensure that the group does not decide to protest again without the 
NYPD’s knowledge. The unit operates around the clock but cannot be used in regions too 
close to the city’s two major airports or when weather conditions prohibit it. Pilots have a 
direct link to executives managing the protest via department radio.153  
12. Mounted Unit 
Officers assigned to the Mounted Unit (MU) conduct patrol functions on horseback. 
A major component of the MU is the crowd control aspect. MU officers are assigned to 
mass gatherings including political demonstrations, parades, sporting events, and 
concerts.154 The mere image of an officer on horseback is an asset to the NYPD in 
maintaining and regaining order. MU personnel work in a team concept under the direct 
supervision of an MU supervisor. MU officers work in the morning and evening shifts but 
do not deploy during extreme weather conditions to maintain the health of the horses.155  
13. Harbor Unit 
The Harbor Unit is the lead law enforcement entity for the hundreds of miles of 
shoreline and waterways that encompass NYC. The Harbor Unit works closely with New 
York City Fire Department (FDNY) and Coast Guard personnel to ensure the safety of all 
who traverse New York Harbor.156 Officers assigned to the unit conduct counterterrorism 
efforts around the clock including infrastructure inspections, checkpoints, radiological 
sweeps, and ferry escorts. If a political demonstration were to occur along the shoreline of 
a location, the Harbor Unit would be notified of the event. If a demonstration was also in 
the immediate vicinity of a ferry terminal, the harbor unit might be tasked with escorting 
the ferries to provide further surveillance of a group. The Counterterrorism Bureau 
maintains a small number of launches of their own to supplement in maritime 
counterterrorism efforts.157 The sole mission of these vessels and officers is 
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counterterrorism, and no other maritime function. These launches have a higher level of 
counterterrorism equipment on board. 
14. Technical Assistance and Response Unit 
The Technical Assistance Response Unit (TARU) is composed of officers who train 
in surveillance technology.158 TARU responds to demonstrations to properly record the 
event. These recordings are used in prosecutions of any arrested individuals and civil 
lawsuits that stem from the demonstrations. An original goal of Occupy Wall Street was 
flooding the legal system with court cases by having members subjected to arrest and file 
numerous civil lawsuits against the NYPD. The video that TARU obtains is a crucial 
resource in adjudicating cases in which an officer is the subject of a frivolous lawsuit.159  
15. Community Affairs Bureau 
The purpose of these officers is to speak directly to members of the community at 
the scene of a demonstration, hear their concerns, and attempt to mediate any issues that 
arise between the police and citizens. These officers do not work directly to police 
demonstrations.  
16. Legal Bureau 
The NYPD Legal Bureau also sends representatives to the scene. The members of 
the Legal Bureau consist of police officers who are lawyers and civilian lawyers.160 The 
Legal Bureau assists the police executives at the scene in determining the proper course of 
action. These representatives ensure the legality for both the members protesting as well as 
the officers policing the demonstration. Demonstrators, too, typically have lawyers to 
observe from their perspective. These lawyers are trained in civil liberties infractions, a 
field in which regular police officers may not have a strong background. Having the 
NYPD’s legal team at a demonstration has become more of a necessity than a support unit. 
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This multi-unit approach helps to maintain a high level of professionalism as well as protect 
the rights of all those present at the protest.161 
17. Counterterrorism Division 
The Counterterrorism Division (CTD) implements a multi-stage approach for 
enhancing counterterrorism efforts and effectively managing initiatives.162 The CTD 
conducts thorough risk assessments of highly vulnerable targets citywide. CTD officers 
deliver expansive counterterrorism training for both members of the NYPD and members 
of the community. The CTD is responsible for hardening specific targets against a variety 
of terrorist attacks, including traditional, chemical, nuclear, and radiological. The division 
briefs the police commissioner and various other high-level executives of the department 
with analysis of both classified and open-source data. The CTD produces media to further 
train NYPD members as well as other counterterrorism stakeholders.163  
18. Hostile Surveillance 
Officers assigned to this unit operate in plain clothes and monitor large gatherings 
and other events.164 For example, these officers might be stationed inside the public pens 
on New Year’s Eve in Times Square. Any further discussion of this team would be law 
enforcement sensitive.  
19. Critical Response Command 
Officers assigned to the Critical Response Command (CRC) are strategically placed 
throughout NYC at high-population locations and other areas deemed to have a high 
potential for terror attacks. These highly visible officers wear full tactical gear including a 
long gun to provide a sense of omnipresence. These officers would also rapidly deploy to 
an ongoing terror or mass causality event. CRC officers are not assigned directly to a 
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planned demonstration nor do they respond to pop-up style events. They respond only in 
the event of a violent terror attack.165 
20. Joint Terrorism Task Force  
NYPD detectives work with a number of other law enforcement agencies, including 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on all terror investigations with implications on the 
NYC area. Topics included in the Joint Terrorism Task Force’s purview include 
intelligence analysis, surveillance, weapons of mass destruction, and domestic and 
international terrorism.166  
21. Bomb Squad 
The Bomb squad is responsible for safely disarming, transporting, and disposing of 
all devices capable of exposing, including bombs, IEDs, and incendiary devices. If a patrol 
officer identifies a suspicious package that could be an explosive, he will request the ESU 
and a supervisor to the scene. If ESU personnel decide further analysis of the item is needed 
or conclude that the item is an explosive device, they will request the Bomb Squad. Bomb 
Squad members are not assigned to demonstrations but are made aware of planned events 
and respond if their skills are needed.167  
22. Intelligence Bureau 
The NYPD’s Intelligence Bureau rivals large federal institutions such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and various agencies under the Department of Homeland Security. 
It is argued that the NYPD’s Intelligence Bureau (INTEL) is the gold standard for domestic 
counterterrorism.168 The purpose of INTEL is to incorporate effective intelligence-led 
policing strategies to safeguard NYC residents, tourists, and critical infrastructure from 
terrorism and violent crime. Officers assigned to INTEL operate in plain clothes and have 
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expertise in such areas as law, international affairs, financial investigations, 
counterterrorism, foreign languages, and computer science.  
INTEL is also responsible for dignitary protection in conjunction with federal 
partners when a foreign diplomat visits NYC. This bureau also oversees all issues that 
might be regulated under the Handschu guidelines, which are discussed in the next chapter. 
Members of INTEL are assigned around the world through the international liaison 
program.169 The officers work closely with local, state, and federal police entities to gather 
intelligence relevant to NYC.170 Currently, the NYPD has officers assigned in London, 
Paris, and the Dominican Republic, among other locations.171 INTEL uses the size and 
diversity of the NYPD to its advantage by using strong community ties to gather 
intelligence and conduct counterterrorism operations.172  
23. Barriers Section 
The Barrier Section is responsible for deploying, storing, and maintaining the 
NYPD’s barriers. The NYPD owns approximately 13,500 metal interlocking barriers and 
1,800 wooden barriers. The Barrier Section has 11 trucks to deploy barriers, and each patrol 
borough has its own truck. Damaged metal barriers are brought to the Harbor Unit Launch 
Repair Shop, where boat mechanics double as welders and repair the damage. 
When a large demonstration is scheduled, the borough chief and his staff coordinate 
with the commanding officer of the Barrier Section in deciding where the barriers will be 
placed. The barriers will be placed in their respective locations in the hours before the 
demonstration. Then, officers assigned to police the demonstration assemble the barriers 
immediately before the event. Because the Barrier Section has few officers, officers from 







B. SUPPORT UNITS 
The units discussed in this section are not on scene of political demonstrations. 
These behind-the-scene units aid the field units in policing the demonstration.  
1. Criminal Justice Bureau 
The mass arrest processing site is located at One Police Plaza to streamline the 
procedure. If a large number of demonstrators engage in civil disobedience and executives 
deem it necessity to effect arrests, they will be brought to the mass arrest processing site. 
A dedicated number of officers will assist the arresting officers in completing the necessary 
paperwork to properly document the arrests. Officers on the scene of the demonstration are 
permitted to effect the arrest of five perpetrators at once. 
2. Operations Division 
The Operations Division is split into two parts, the Operations Unit (OPS) and the 
Detail Section. The Operations Division is tasked with operating the Joint Operations 
Command Center (JOC). OPS is the parent command for NYPD officers who are assigned 
to work with other city agencies such as the Office of Emergency Management and the 
FDNY. During large planned events, such as the ball dropping in Times Square and the 
fireworks on Independence Day, the JOC is activated. During an activation, representatives 
from myriad city, state, and federal agencies are physically present to expedite intelligence 
sharing and resource movement.  
a. Operations Unit 
OPS is a notification and informational unit that works 24 hours per day, seven 
days a week, and is aware of everything occurring citywide. OPS personnel monitor 
ongoing situations, such as demonstrations, police-involved shootings, or other major 
newsworthy catastrophes, and notify the proper NYPD executives.  
The OPS is responsible for disseminating certain information about events going 
on throughout NYC. This task is completed by generating an OPS page. When a pop-up 
demonstration, mobilization, shooting, newsworthy incident, fatal car accident, or power 
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outage occurs, the OPS dispatches an email about the event. The email is distributed to all 
executives of the rank of captain and above while the page is disseminated to all other 
members of the NYPD whose commanding officer (CO) or the CO of the Operations 
Division deems have a need to know.  
Members of OPS are also responsible for the upkeep of the Demonstration 
Database. This “demo” database was first implemented on November 1, 2007. Its purpose 
has been to keep a record and running log of both pop-up and planned demonstrations. 
Figure 10 depicts the number of demonstrations entered into the database since 2012. 
Included in the database are various events, such as parades or other mass gatherings, that 
the operations desk supervisor (lieutenant or sergeant) deems necessary. Factors in 
deciding whether to add the event to the database include the likelihood there will be 
counter-protesters, crowd size, newsworthiness, location, and the possibility of a mass 
arrest situation. For example, a New York Yankee game would not qualify for the database.  
Each demonstration added to the database has two components. The first is the pre-
operational intelligence, which is entered the day before the event. On the day of the 
demonstration, INTEL analyzes the list and can add to, concur with, or delete the event 
from the list. INTEL is responsible for the investigation of political groups under the 
Handschu guidelines. The pre-operational part includes the start and end times, date, 
precinct and borough of occurrence, actual address, type of location, specific group if 
known, purpose for demonstration, and number of officers assigned. After the 
demonstration, the second part is completed. This portion includes the actual start and end 
times, the number of protesters at its peak, field command post information if applicable, 
the name of the incident commander (can be the patrol supervisor), the officer who relayed 
information to OPS, the OPS police officer or detective who entered the information, the 
OPS supervisor notified of the event, and general remarks. In the remarks field, a final 
summary is written in chronological order and documents any arrests, the pedigree of the 
perpetrators, the unit that effected the arrests (typically the SRG or patrol), and the location 
where the arrests were processed. 
In the event of a pop-up or unplanned demonstration, the patrol supervisor 
immediately responds and notifies the respective patrol bureau and OPS, which completes 
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the demonstration data to the best of its ability and generates a page. OPS immediately 
notifies the SRG regardless of whether the patrol supervisor activates a Level 1 
mobilization. 
From its inception to August 6, 2019, the database captured 18,034 events (Figure 
10). Internal sources relay information regarding specific protests if arrests are planned or 
made. Planned arrests do not usually occur at pop-up protests. Further analysis of this 
database is discussed in Chapter VI.  
 
Figure 10. Number of Demonstrations in OPS Database 2012–2019173 
b. Detail Section 
As previously highlighted, one of the greatest strengths of the NYPD is its sheer 
size. When large planned events require additional resources from the onset, the Detail 
Section is tasked with assigning officers. For example, the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day 
Parade draws hundreds of thousands of spectators along the route. The parade takes place 
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in two patrol boroughs, Manhattan South and Manhattan North. These two boroughs do 
not have the adequate resources to police the event, so the Detail Section deploys officers 
from the outer boroughs and the Detective Bureau to fully staff the event. 
Larger political demonstrations may require the Detail Section to assign resources 
from precincts away if large crowds are expected. During the Women’s March, for 
example, the Detail Section had to go to work because of the anticipated large crowd.174 
Another function of the Detail Section is assigning resources in real time. September 20, 
2019, saw a climate change demonstration in the vicinity of NYC City Hall. While the 
event had been issued a permit for 5,000 people, the turnout was much greater than that.175 
The Mayor’s Office estimated that 60,000 people attended while event organizers had the 
number at 250,000.176 It was clear to executives on the scene that the number of officers 
assigned to the climate strike would not suffice. The Detail Section mobilized additional 
resources from precincts, PSAs, and transit districts citywide. If the Detail Section is not 
working and time is an overwhelming factor, NYPD executives can transmit a rapid 
mobilization, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
3. Lower Manhattan Security Initiative 
The NYPD’s Domain Awareness System (DAS) is a crucial piece of technology 
for all NYPD officers. The DAS closed circuit television (CCTV) component rivals that of 
the Iron Ring in London.177 This application aggregates real-time data from 
counterterrorism sensors and law enforcement databases, providing members of the service 
with a comprehensive view of potential threats and criminal activity. The DAS aggregates 
and correlates information from counterterrorism sensors deployed around the NYC, such 
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as CCTV, license plate readers, and environmental sensors, with dozens of law 
enforcement and public safety data sources. 
Officers assigned to the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative are responsible for the 
information flow within the DAS application. These administrative officers also supply 
intelligence to frontline officers or those conducting ongoing investigations. These officers 
assist in detecting threats and conducting pre-operational surveillance.178 
4. Information Technology Bureau 
This bureau is responsible for issuing and maintaining NYPD iPhones, body-worn 
cameras (BWCs), and hardware that powers the DAS, among other pieces of technology. 
5. Communications Division 
This division dedicates specific radio frequencies for all units, regardless of their 
location. Typically, two or three precincts share a radio frequency. When officers are flown 
in from various commands to help police a demonstration under one command, they are 
instructed to switch their radio frequency bandwidth to a citywide one. 
6. Life Safety Systems Division 
This division maintains and deploys the mobile command posts for large events, 
for example, large demonstrations, Independence Day festivities, presidential visits, and 
United Nations events.  
7. Training Bureau 
The Training Bureau (TB) is responsible for providing members of the NYPD with 
the knowledge and skillset to best serve NYC. The TB is responsible for both the Police 
Academy and all in-service training, which includes education in firearms, tactics, 
plainclothes procedures, basic life support, and fair and impartial policing. The following 
TB units have been identified as important in the realm of political demonstrations: 
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a. Tactical Training Unit 
Design and facilitate a wide range of in-service training programs designed 
to educate the uniformed patrol force on how to make sound legal and 
tactical decisions when faced with stressful and dynamic investigative 
encounters, utilizing effective physical instruction on defensive team tactics 
under the Department’s use of force guidelines.179  
b. Advanced Training Unit 
Design and facilitate a wide range of in-service training programs, 
encompassing the most relevant, current, and comprehensive information 
on such topics as effective community relations vigilant pursuit of crime 
reduction, and professional development. These programs are geared to the 
uniformed patrol force, and include routine unit training delivered via the 
Command Level Training Program.180 
c. Leadership Development Section 
Design and facilitate high-quality promotional training for captains, 
lieutenants, sergeants, and civilian supervisors. Provide practical, job- 
relevant promotional and in-service leadership training and management-
skills training to lieutenants, sergeants, and civilian supervisors. Research, 
present, and evaluate training sessions for supervisors, managers, and other 
populations, as required.181  
d. Uniform Promotions Unit  
Develop and facilitate promotional training for captains, lieutenants, and 
sergeants. Provide practical and relevant promotional and in-service 
leadership training and management-skills training.182 
e. Executive Development Unit 
Develop a program of course offerings that is responsive to the operational 
and developmental needs of in-service captains and above, as well as 
equivalent-level civilian managers. Responsible for ensuring that 
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executives participate in the Executive Development program and tracking 
their promotion.183 
f. Citywide Incident Management System Unit 
Provide uniformed members of the service with principles and tactics 
regarding mobilizations, crowd control, and command-post operations, 
according to the guidelines of the Citywide Incident Management System. 
. . . Develop and evaluate training exercises for the NYPD and for multi-
agency participation.184 
g. Specialized Training Section 
Provide up-to-date, relevant training to in-service uniformed members of 
the service. Provide hands-on training in self-defense and less-lethal tactics. 
Conduct computer training for computer software and mainframe 
applications in the Department. Conduct and coordinate entry-level and in-
service training for civilian members of the service.185 
h. Special Weapons Unit 
Conduct all special weapons training and requalification of designated units 
and personnel, including, but not limited to, ESU, Harbor, Aviation, 
Highway, SRG, CRC, Canine, and undercover officers.186 
i. Advanced Tactical Firearms Training Course Unit 
This two-day program is designed to emphasize the use of proper tactics 
and improve shooting skills. It is a reality-based firearms training aimed at 
exposing plainclothes anti-crime personnel to scenarios that simulate 
situations which they will likely encounter on patrol. This training is 
available to Patrol, Transit, and Housing Bureau anti-crime teams.187 
j. Firearms and Tactics Section 
Develop skills required for the safe and proficient used of firearms. Instruct 
and re-qualify uniformed members of the service with firearms. Provide 
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entry-level training for newly-hired officers. Provide strategy and tactics 
training to minimize firearm use and improve firearm safety.188 
k. Field Training Coordination Unit  
Responsible for initial training of all Field Training Officers. Collaborate 
with the Office of the Chief of Department to manage the overall operation 
of the FTO [field training officer] program. Produce annual program for 
FTOs to participate in to identify program strengths.189 
l. Community Liaison Unit  
Serve as the main outreach component to the community in order to 
exchange ideas and information and provide transparency to the 
development of NYPD training curricula in partnership with community 
organizations.190 
m. Recruit Training Section  
Provide a recruit training program of instruction to prepare recruit officers 
to perform effectively in their field assignments. Coordinate all logistical 
and administrate tasks associate with recruit officer training.191 
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IV. NYPD CURRICULUM, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES 
Previous chapters demonstrated how police officers confronted political protests 
that spiraled out of control and for which they were unprepared. To explain the NYPD’s 
training for such events, this chapter analyzes three training aspects in which officers learn 
how to police political demonstrations. Topics appear in the order that police cadets and 
then officers encounter them in training: The Police Academy curriculum, Activity Log 
inserts, and Patrol Guide procedures. Officers start their police careers learning at the 
Police Academy and then use the Activity Log inserts for their time out in the field. Officers 
then gain an intimate knowledge of the Patrol Guide as they study for the civil service 
promotional examinations and use specific guide procedures more frequently throughout 
their careers. In order to clarify parts of this chapter, a summary of each rank in the NYPD 
appears in Appendix B. 
A. POLICE ACADEMY CURRICULUM 
The NYPD Police Academy (PA) spans six months and teaches newly sworn 
officers the necessary skills for a successful career with the department. The academy 
presents both physical tactics and traditional classroom learning. The classroom portion 
has three parts: police science, social science, and law. The PA’s Student Guide (SG) forms 
the training material for the PA. The following procedures have been identified as relevant 
for policing political demonstrations as well as counterterrorism efforts. 
1. Police Science: Maintaining Public Order (Chapter 11) 
First Amendment rights are foremost and provide the framework for this policy 
because all Americans have the right to assemble and discuss topics regardless of whether 
the concept is “right” or “wrong.” Examples of this right include protesting in City Hall 
Park and disseminating literature supporting a cause. The parameters for permits are 
outlined as well. Demonstration is defined as “including organized groups comprised of 
many persons as well as the individual or small groups of individuals who utilize free 
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speech and assembly to further their cause.”192 New York City’s Administrative Code 
requires that one must obtain a permit before hosting a street parade or demonstration.193 
The NYPD issues such permits for sound amplification devices and has discretion in 
issuing them based on variables including time and location. 
Officers are provided with regulations for policing demonstrations. “To the extent 
possible, the job of the police is to protect both the demonstrators’ right of assembly and 
the right of non-demonstrators to peaceful and unobstructed passage.”194 Officers should 
use police barricades to aid in this task. In this way, officers can create areas for 
demonstrators to rally while safely allowing non-participants to continue along their path. 
If demonstrators begin to obstruct pedestrian or vehicle traffic, they must be warned that 
continuing to do so will result in arrests. When issuing a permit for a demonstration, the 
NYPD uses the “sight and sound” ideology. Demonstrators are entitled to be as near the 
target of their demonstration as safely possible. However, if the NYPD deems that a 
specific location has the potential for violence or a riot, it is permitted to move the 
demonstration to a safer area. This discretion is not a violation of the rights of the 
demonstrators.  
This chapter of the SG also surmises the difference between intentional and 
incidental blocking of a street, sidewalk, and entryways into a building. To reach a level of 
criminality, an individual or group must create a serious annoyance and intend to 
inconvenience the public.195 An example would be blocking the entrance of a store front 
so that patrons are unable to enter. The ranking NYPD supervisor on the scene of a 
demonstration decides where barriers are to be placed as well as the location to which the 
demonstrators will march. If a reasonable request is made by police, and demonstrators 
refuse the request, they will be subject to arrest or summons. No set standard determines 
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the number of demonstrators allowed at specific demonstrations. Depending on the exact 
location, the protest may generate more problems as the number of demonstrators rises. 
Demonstrations frequently target commercial and civic districts of New York City. 
This choice aids in the demonstrators’ reaching the largest number of listeners, and most 
likely, the cause of their frustration falls within one of these two parameters. Demonstrators 
rarely occur in residential areas, but no specific laws prohibit demonstrations there. In 
neighborhoods, demonstrators violate laws such as unreasonable noise that cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. One example in the SG describes a group chanting in 
the early morning hours in a residential area when citizens are trying to sleep vis-à-vis in a 
more commercial area. 
Police officers are an extension of the government that employs them. 
Demonstrators frequently harass police officers through offensive language and personal 
insults, a type of language protected by the First Amendment. Often, such slang intends to 
cause police officers to overreact, yet officers must remain calm and use a high level of 
restraint in these situations. Officers must understand that freedom of speech is an 
inalienable right and cannot be violated based on the officer’s personal opinions of the 
subject. Verbal abuse of a police officer alone does not satisfy an official charge of 
harassment because it must be accompanied by physical contact. 
In certain cases, demonstrations do become violent. If officers observe 
demonstrators physically assaulting other people or destroying property, an arrest should 
be made. The ranking supervisors on scene, however, may decline to immediately arrest 
the guilty parties. This decision is based on variables such as manpower, further crowd 
agitation, endangerment of officer safety, and the overall safety of the public. Police 
officers must remain objective throughout a demonstration. If officers fail in their 
objectivity, tensions with the group can escalate. Such a failure could endanger fellow 
officers, bystanders, and non-violent protestors. If demonstrators are non-violent but 
obstruct pedestrian or vehicular traffic intentionally, officers must warn them that failing 
to move will result in arrests. At demonstrations, onlookers can observe both the 
demonstrators and police officers but must not interfere with the administration of police 
duties. Spectators can photograph and videotape the demonstration including the officers, 
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who may use force only as necessary to prevent a crime, make an arrest, or protect a fellow 
officer or member of the public. Force is never to be used as a punishment.196  
Civil disorder and rioting involve a population engaging in lawlessness. These 
extremely dangerous situations are the most challenging for police officers. A key solution 
for disrupting lawlessness is rapid mobilization, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
The NYPD learned from such riots as the Crown Heights riot in 1991 and the Rodney King 
Riots in Los Angeles in 1992 to help formulate plans to best police these situations. 
Communication between the police and the public, especially with community leaders, is 
key in maintaining the peace and ending chaotic scenes. At the scene of civil disorder, 
demonstrators may engage in the use of homemade weapons, small arms, or explosives.197 
Demonstrators may also use regular household items such as bottles, bricks, and rocks 
against police officers. Officers must not panic and act within the “general plan of action,” 
even when demonstrators use fireworks or other loud noises to disorient them. Officers 
must use the utmost caution in deciding to discharge their firearms at the scene of civil 
disorder because doing so may endanger innocent bystanders and only further agitate 
protestors.198  
2. Law: Civil Disorder Offenses (Chapter 14) 
This SG chapter outlines for the reader the laws that pertain to civil disobedience, 
but at no point does it discuss the vulnerability of mass demonstrations to terrorist events. 
This chapter outlines the rights protected by the First Amendment, but expression of such 
rights does not allow individuals to violate overall public safety or diminish the quality of 
life for others.199 The first criminal crime discussed is the charge of disorderly conduct: 
A person commits disorderly conduct when he or she: intentionally or 
recklessly creates a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm by 
one of the following seven methods: 
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1. Fighting or violent or threatening behavior 
2. Unreasonable noise 
3. Obscene language or gesture 
4. Disrupts a lawful assembly 
5. Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic 
6. Refusal to comply with a lawful order to disperse (3 or more 
people)  
7. Hazardous or physically offensive condition200 
Frequently at political demonstrations, individuals purposely choose to become subject to 
arrest to drive home their statement. Such behavior was seen in France during the yellow 
jacket protests. This SG chapter continues by providing examples of the above seven 
charges. The example for the fifth offense discusses protesters positioning themselves on 
the street so that vehicles cannot pass. For the sixth offense, the following example is given: 
A group of people gather outside City Hall to protest tax increases. They 
have no intention of causing public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. 
However, because of their reckless actions, pedestrians are inconvenienced 
and annoyed. If they refused to move after being directed by a police officer, 
they would be charged with disorderly conduct. If their actions caused 
interference with vehicular or pedestrian traffic, then they would also be 
charged with subdivision 5 as well as subdivision 6.201  
Intent to cause inconvenience, alarm, and annoyance must also exist if an officer is to arrest 
an individual for these charges. 
Part II of this SG chapter discusses loitering. Subdivision 4 discusses the wearing 
of masks: 
Being masked or in any manner disguised by unusual or unnatural attire or 
facial alteration, loiters, remains or congregates in public place with other 
person so masked or disguised, or knowingly permits or aids persons so 
masked or disguised to congregate in a public place; except that such 
conduct is not unlawful when it occurs in connection with a masquerade 
party or like entertainment if, when such entertainment is held in a city 
which has promulgated regulations in connection with such affairs, 
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permission is first obtained from the police or other appropriate 
authorities.202 
Part III outlines factors that constitute a charge of unlawful assembly. The act of 
unlawful assembly should be considered a precursor to a possible riot. There are two 
scenarios that qualify for this charge: 
1. “He or she assembles with four or more people for the purpose of 
engaging or preparing to engage with them in tumultuous (loud, agitated 
behavior) and violent conduct likely to cause public alarm.”203 
2. “Being present at an assembly with four or more other people which either 
has or develops the purpose of engaging in or preparing to engage in 
tumultuous and violent conduct and he or she remains there with the intent 
to advance that purpose.”204 
Part IV discusses offenses regarding riots and inciting riots. The charge of inciting 
a riot is established when an individual “urges ten or more person to engage in tumultuous 
and violent conduct likely to create public alarm.” There are two different degrees to this 
charge: misdemeanor or felony.205 To establish the misdemeanor charge, a person 
• Simultaneously with four or more other persons; 
• Engages in tumultuous and violent conduct; and  
• Intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing 
public alarm.206 
The SG cites the following example: “Five radical students enter Grand Central Station 
carrying protest signs attached to heavy wooden sticks. As they march through the station, 
they begin to shout obscenities and wave their signs in a menacing manner, thereby causing 
the commuters to flee the area.”207  
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The factors that would raise the charge to inciting a riot in the first degree would 
be when a person 
• Simultaneously with ten or more persons; 
• Engages in tumultuous and violent conduct; and  
• Intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing 
public alarm; and  
• A person other than a participant suffers a physical injury or 
substantial property damage occurs.208  
The SG provides the following example: 
A group of 11 people are demonstrating in front of a courthouse inside 
which a controversial criminal case is being tried. As the defendant appears, 
the group begins to scream obscenities and throw debris. During this 
activity, a non-participant is struck by a rock and injured, numerous 
windows are broken and other property is damaged.209  
This section concludes by conveying the point that the recruit will be policing large crowds 
during one’s career. Those large crowds do include “demonstrations, public events, civil 
disorder and strikes.”210 The SG reiterates the point that members of the NYPD take an 
oath to protect the lives of all citizens and enforce the law impartially. NYPD officers must 
strike a balance between respecting someone’s rights and safeguarding property and 
people.  
3. Social Science: Neighborhood Policing and Problem Solving 
(Chapter 4) 
The neighborhood policing model is the NYPD’s backbone in serving the citizens 
of NYC. The mission statement for this model is as following: “Enhance the quality of life 
in New York City by working in partnership with the community to enforce the law, 
preserve the peace protect the people, reduce fear and maintain order.”211 The model strives 
to accomplish three goals: prevent and investigate crime, promote trust and respect, solve 
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problems, and address quality-of-life conditions collaboratively.212 Patrol officers are 
deployed in three roles to work within the neighborhood framework: NCOs, steady sectors, 
and response autos. NCOs, as previously discussed, work in conjunction with the steady 
sectors to solve crimes and other issues that plague the community. The rest of the chapter 
discusses the model officers should employ in their community-serving efforts. 
B. ACTIVITY LOG INSERTS 
Every officer below the rank of captain must maintain an “Activity Log,” a 
chronological summary of what the officer did during his tour of duty. This log includes 
what his or her assignment was for the day, all radio runs assigned, and a brief synopsis of 
any paperwork completed (e.g., arrests, complaints, and aided cards). Officers carry their 
Activity Logs in a leather binder, along with summonses and inserts, which they can fit in 
their back pocket. Activity Log inserts are tips, summaries, and best practices for certain 
situations: 23 inserts are required to be with officers at all times. In early 2020, activity 
logs were transitioned to a digital application that officers access through their department 
iPhones. The inserts appear as a separate publication on the phone. 
The following Activity Log inserts most pertain to demonstrations: the active 
shooter response protocol reference card, the body-worn camera reference guide, and 
possible indicators of terrorist activity. Activity Log inserts are a quick reference that 
officers can digest instantaneously.  
1. Active Shooter Response Protocol Reference Card  
This card provides the NYPD’s definition of an active shooter and reinforces the 
priority that the officer is to “make contact with the suspect and stop the killing.”213 The 
card further provides a 23-step process for properly policing the shooter within NYPD 
guidelines. The card contains further subtleties as the steps progress including the 
procedure for gaining entry, tactical considerations, and post-threat elimination. Immediate 
 
212 New York City Police Department, 3. 
213 New York City Police Department, “Active Shooter Response Protocol Reference Card,” PD 624-
112 (New York: New York City Police Department, 2015), 1. 
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entry, teamwork, and communication are key elements stressed throughout the 
progression.214 
2. Body-Worn Camera Reference Guide 
This insert is broken down into four categories: mandatory activations, prohibited 
recordings, categories, and tag options. One of the tag options listed is demonstrations/civil 
disobedience. Mandatory activations pertaining to demonstrations include persons 
suspected of criminal activity, use-of-force encounters, and arrests.215 
3. Possible Indicators of Terrorist Activity 
Of the three Activity Log inserts mentioned, this is the most relevant and the only 
one law enforcement sensitive. The procedure breaks down various indicators of potential 
terrorist activity and provides officers with a set of questions to help further their 
investigation. Political demonstrations are not mentioned, but a note instructs officers not 
to interfere with constitutionally protected rights.216  
C. PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURES 
The NYPD Patrol Guide (PG) provides the standard operating procedures for the 
agency. A careful analysis of the Patrol Guide has resulted in identifying the following 
procedures as relevant in policing protests and demonstrations. Likewise, this thesis treats 
procedures that discuss terrorist attacks. Most procedures begin with the purpose followed 
by key definitions for the procedure and then describe by officer rank how the procedure 
should be carried out. “Notes” and “additional data” are frequently used throughout the 
procedure to further clarify key points. This author has analyzed those procedures 
identified as needing clarity or supplemental instruction. The PG is broken down into 21 
 
214 New York City Police Department. 
215 New York City Police Department, “Body-Worn Camera Reference Guide,” PD 620-181 (New 
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sections. The remainder of this chapter explores the sections on mobilizations/emergency 
incidents, command operations, and tactical operations. 
1. Mobilizations/Emergency Incidents (213)  
The procedures included in this section of the PG involve large-scale and 
emergency incidents. The sections discuss ways to mobilize additional personnel and 
guidelines for mass arrest situations. 
a. Emergency Incidents (Procedure 213-02) 
Emergency incidents are defined as “a serious accident, vehicle collision, 
explosion, civil disorder, demonstration, or similar incident.”217 The initial police officer 
on scene should take appropriate police action, request additional personnel and equipment 
if necessary, and request that the patrol supervisor “respond all” via the communications 
section. (Numerous procedures describe responding via the communications section, 
which simply means using one’s NYPD radio through the dispatcher.) 
The first supervisor on scene, typically the patrol supervisor or platoon commander, 
is tasked with the following: 
1. Evaluating the previous action 
2. Determining whether a Level 1 mobilization is required (as discussed in 
this chapter). If a patrol supervisor call for a mobilization, he or she must 
select a location able to accommodate a Level 3 or 4 mobilization. 
3. Notifying the following of all pertinent details: the precinct desk officer, 
OPS, and the respective patrol borough 
4. Assigning duties and responsibilities under the Citywide Incident 
Management System model 
 
217 New York City Police Department, Mobilization/Emergency Incidents: Emergency Incidents, Patrol 
Guide Procedure No. 213-02 (New York: New York City Police Department, 2013), 1. 
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5. Preparing a detail roster of current resources 
6. When the CO, executive officer, and deputy chief respond, inform them of 
all actions taken, details of the event, and who and what is already on 
scene.  
When the CO, executive officer, or duty chief arrive on scene, they will take command of 
the incident. They will thoroughly analyze the steps taken by the patrol supervisor or 
platoon commander. They will then determine whether further mobilization is required 
beyond Level 1. As the incident concludes, they will also develop a plan to return to normal 
and return all officers assigned to the incident back to their assigned patrol functions. 
The additional data portion of the procedure discusses the chain of command if 
higher executives arrive on scene based on the severity of the incident. The notes also 
reiterate that Harbor, Scuba, and Aviation Unit personnel are available 24 hours a day if 
their services are needed.218 
b. Rapid Mobilization (Procedure 213-03) 
This procedure outlines how to request additional personnel to the scene of an 
unusual disorder or emergency situation and how they should respond. The initial 
supervisor on scene will activate the mobilization process. Table 3  breaks down the four 
levels of mobilization: 
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Table 3. Levels of Mobilization219 






Captain or Above Captain or Above Captain or Above 
Who 
Responds 




• ESU  
• Aviation  









• Additional SRG 
as determined 
by OPS 
• 1 sergeant and 8 
police officers 
from each patrol 
precinct and PSA 
in the borough 
concerned  
• 3 lieutenants 
based on the 
borough of the 
activation 
• 1 sergeant and 8 
police officers 
from the Transit 
Bureau 
• 2 sergeants and 
20 police officers 
with vehicles 
from the 
Highway District  
• 2 sergeants and 
10 police officers 
from the 
Mounted Unit 
• 1 sergeant and 2 
police officers 





• 3 additional lieutenants per 
the borough conference  
• 1 lieutenant from the transit 
borough concerned  
• 1 lieutenant from the 
housing borough concerned 
• 1 sergeant and 8 police 
officers per precinct and 
housing borough mobilized 
• 1 sergeant and 8 police 
officers from transit 
borough concerned based 
on their bureau plan 
• 1 additional sergeant and 
10 police officers with 
vehicles from the highway 
district  
• 2 additional sergeants and 
10 police officers from the 
Mounted Unit  
• Additional arrest 
processing vehicle  
• 1 sergeant and 4 police 
officers from the Police 
Academy Firearm and 
Tactics Section  
• Additional peacekeeper 
vehicle  
• Help car 
• Command post vehicle 















• ESU supervisor • Citywide duty chief 
• Executives from housing 
and transit to serve on 
command staff 
 
219 Adapted from New York City Police Department, Mobilization/Emergency Incidents: Rapid 
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The authorizing executive can activate a Level 2 or higher mobilization en route. 
He or she must confirm with one of the following when transmitting a Level 2 mobilization 
or higher when not physically present: the patrol supervisor, platoon commander, patrol 
borough concerned, or the Operations Unit.220 Mobilization levels do not have to be 
transmitted in numerical order.221 Caution must be used, however, when skipping a specific 
mobilization level because personnel from the previous level will not respond.222  
c. Mobilization Readiness Levels (Procedure 213-04) 
Readiness levels parallel their corresponding mobilization levels. The purpose of a 
readiness level is to alert all corresponding units that a mobilization has been initiated. 
When a mobilization occurs, it automatically initiates a readiness level. OPS and 
Communications transmit most notifications. The procedure concludes with various 
definitions of duties in the Citywide Incident Management System structure, such as 
incident commander and operations officer.223 
d. Duties at an Unusual Disorder (Procedure #213-05) 
This procedure underlines the duties and responsibilities in response to an 
unplanned or pop-up protest or when a planned protest becomes too populous or violent. 
If a demonstration is preplanned, police assets will already be assigned to the location of 
the event.  
In this procedure, the CO, executive officer, duty inspector, duty captain, or any 
other applicable NYPD member of higher rank should instruct all supervisors (sergeant 
and above) of the following: the nature of the disorder, the mission and objectives, the team 
mentality (no individual action will be tolerated), and the need to report important or 
 
220 New York City Police Department. 
221 New York City Police Department. 
222 New York City Police Department. 
223 New York City Police Department, Mobilization/Emergency Incidents: Mobilization Readiness 
Levels, Patrol Guide Procedure No. 213-04 (New York: New York City Police Department, 2019), 5. 
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unusual events immediately to the command post.224 It does not state that these executive 
officers should disseminate intelligence known of the group such as any vital history.225  
e. Large Scale Arrest Processing Procedure (Procedure 213-06) 
Often at political demonstrations, participants practice civil disobedience to further 
their point, with perhaps dozens of demonstrators simultaneously participating. If 20 or 
more individuals become subject to arrest, this procedure outlines how to process all 
perpetrators at one time. 
Borough commanders (BCs) ensure that there is a list of priority precinct 
stationhouses that have the capability of properly housing the arrested. The factors detailed 
in this order include the number of prisoners the precinct can house close to the arrest 
scene. Yet an arresting officer should not process more than five prisoners at once, should 
have an intimate knowledge of the situation, and clearly articulate all factors of the charge 
to the respective assistant district attorney who will draw up the formal complaint. 
The arresting officer (AO)’s supervisor will ensure that a photograph is taken of the 
AO and the perpetrator he or she processes. This photograph will take place before the AO 
and perpetrator board the patrol wagon, which takes them to the arrest processing site. AOs 
will follow all standard arrest procedures.226 
f. Policing Special Events/Crowd Control (Procedure 213- 11) 
The guiding purpose behind this procedure is to outline how police conduct crowd 
control at special events. Political protests and demonstrations fit the criteria of this 
procedure due to media coverage, the propensity to draw large crowds, and the notoriety 
of the demonstration’s location. The procedure starts with three key definitions: the 
incident commander, places of public assembly, and special events. 
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The incident commander at an event fitting these parameters will be the highest-
ranking uniformed police supervisor. The incident commander is defined as follows: 
The highest-ranking uniformed police supervisor responsible for the 
command, control and coordination of all incident operations. For planned 
events such as parades, demonstrations, and similar situations, the precinct 
commanding officer will ordinarily be designated as incident commander. 
If the event occurs in two or more commands within the same patrol 
borough, the patrol borough commander will be designated as incident 
commander, and in cases where the event affects more than one patrol 
borough, the Chief of Patrol will be designated as incident commander.227 
A place of public assembly is defined simply as the location of the event. Examples include 
theaters, arenas, gymnasiums, and ballrooms. Political protests and demonstrations tend to 
occur on public sidewalks and parks and at popular sites such as Union Square, Trump 
Tower, and Dag Hammarskjold Park (adjacent to the United Nations).  
The precinct’s commanding officer determines whether an event requires special 
police coverage.228 These listed factors help to determine whether additional police 
presence is necessary: 
• Size and demographics of crowd expected to attend event 
• Size and layout of the event facility 
• Past critiques of similar events 
• Criminal history of location 
• Availability of alcohol 
• Presence of notables/personalities, live music or entertainers  
• Previous history of disruption or problems associated with or due to 
reputations of, or specific issues related to speaker or performers,  
• Manner of ticket sales (box office, advance tickets, door sales, mail, 
lottery, outlets, etc.) 




227 New York City Police Department, Mobilization/Emergency Incidents: Policing Special 
Events/Crowd Control, Patrol Guide Procedure No. 213-11 (New York: New York City Police Department, 
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• Nature or sensitivity of the event  
• Presence of private security 
• Presence or possibility of opponents or counter demonstrators.229  
Once knowledge is gained of the event, notifications must be made to the 
Operations Unit, Intelligence Bureau, and the precinct’s community affairs officer. The 
incident commander will determine whether a pre-event conference will be conducted. If 
a large crowd is expected or the need for medical assistance likely, a member of the FDNY 
will be notified to attend. The procedure re-affirms that the police department will not 
engage in investigations of political activity unless conducted by the Intelligence Division, 
as specified in Procedure 212-72, which involves the Handschu guidelines. If the incident 
commander determines that the use of the Mounted Unit is necessary for crowd control, he 
or she must ensure that the crowd has a way to leave the area: “When notified that a 
demonstration is to occur, incident commander will cooperate with persons in charge to 
the extent possible, balancing their right to free expression with the need to maintain public 
safety. The Legal Bureau should be contacted as soon as possible to assist in planning and 
arrange for response of a Department attorney if needed.”230 
If the location of a demonstration is public, it will be difficult for the police 
department to convey to the group that it is not allowed to demonstrate. The police 
determine the suitability of a demonstration venue based on the following factors: 
• Time and date  
• Volume of vehicular and pedestrian traffic  
• Proximity of any other related or unrelated events  
• Schools, hospitals, houses of worship, or large public or business 
facilities nearby  
• Any other condition which may create a hazard or serious 
inconvenience to the public or participants.231  
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2. Command Operations (212) 
This section of the PG is one of the longest and most diverse content wise. The 
topics discussed in this section include fire, body-worn cameras, and the procedure 
dictating the Handschu guidelines.  
a. Fire (Procedure 212-58) 
The main mission of the NYPD at the scene of a fire is to facilitate the FDNY’s 
response in any way possible. The procedure dictates that “uniformed members are not 
trained in, or equipped for, fire suppression or fire rescue operations and should avoid 
entering any building that is on fire.”232 Responding officers should not park their vehicles 
in a way that interferes with FDNY operations. Patrol supervisors will ensure that fire 
hydrants are accessible and that a clear and open route is available for emergency medical 
services. The desk officer will notify OPS and the parent command of such factors as deaths 
or injuries, three alarms or more, suspicious fires, and the relocation of tenants.233  
b. Use of Body-Worn Cameras (Procedure 212-123) 
The main purpose behind the NYPD’s decision to implement this piece of 
technology is to build a positive, transparent relationship with the community and 
successfully prosecute criminals. Creating and implementing a policy concerning the use 
of cameras for a department this large is extremely complex. This eight-page procedure 
explains the regulations that every officer who is assigned a camera must follow. The 
procedure highlights instances of mandatory activation, deactivation of the camera, 
prohibited recordings, and supervisory and administrative functions. The most vital part of 
this document describes when an officer is obligated to activate his or her camera. These 
instances include but are not limited to any potential in progress assignments, disorderly 
persons or groups, calls of assistance from another officer, any incident involving any type 
of weapon, arrest situations, and the issuing of a summons. 
 
232 New York City Police Department, Command Operations: Fire, Patrol Guide Procedure No. 212-
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The procedure has a dedicated section for demonstrations and civil disobedience. 
For example, officers can only record interactions if they become involved in one of the 
cases listed in the mandatory activation section. It also reiterates that “TARU remains 
solely responsible for documenting protests, demonstrations, political events, etc., by 
means of photos and/or video.”234 
c. Investigations Involving Political Activities (Procedure 212-72) 
The basis and history for this procedure were discussed early in the literature 
review. The procedure itself is brief. The two appendices are lengthy and extremely 
detailed regarding the caselaw agreements. INTEL is responsible for the following: 
investigations of possible unlawful or terrorist related activity that involve 
political activity, including the collection, analysis processing, retention, 
and dissemination of information concerning person, groups, or 
organizations involved in political activity investigative inquires that 
involve political activity.235  
The Handschu guidelines form the parameters for investigations. The procedure provides 
five key definitions: 
• “Political Activity: The exercise of a right of expression or association 
for the purpose of maintaining or changing governmental politics or 
social conditions.”236  
• “Investigation: A police activity which is undertaken to obtain 
information or evidence.”237 
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• “Lead: Information submitted to or obtained or developed by the 
Intelligence Bureau concerning an ongoing investigation or, that may 
be used to initiate a new investigation.”238  
• “Investigative Statement: A detailed written request submitted under 
this procedure to obtain approval for the initiation of a Preliminary 
Inquiry, Full Investigation, or Terrorism Enterprise Investigation.”239  
• “Authorized Officials: The Intelligence Bureau official (specifically, 
the Chief of Intelligence, Executive Officer of the Intelligence Bureau, 
or the Commanding Officer of the Criminal Intelligence Section) 
authorized to approve request to initiate or extend a Preliminary 
Inquiry, Full Investigation, or Terrorism Enterprise Investigation.”240  
Under the Handschu guidelines, there are three levels of investigation, each bound 
by its own set of rules and timelines. Table 4 further explains each level. 
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Table 4. Levels of Handschu Investigation241 
























• At this level, there is not 
enough intelligence to 
warrant a full investigation, 
but further investigation may 
yield the necessity to 
conduct one. 
• An authorizing official must 
authorize a preliminarily 
inquiry, which will be 
submitted in writing.  
• The inquiry will last 180 
days from the origin of the 
investigation, which may not 
be the same day as the 
written request was 
submitted.  
• Requests can be made for a 
90-day extension.  
• If an investigation lasts 
longer than 18 months, the 
Handschu Committee and 
the deputy commissioner of 
INTEL will review the 
investigation.  
• At this level, all investigative 
techniques are authorized 
including conducting 
undercover operations except 
mail openings, eaves 
dropping, and certain 
situations of video 




A full investigation will 
be authorized when: 
• Circumstances 
reasonably indicate that 
an unlawful act has been, 
is being, or will be 
committed. A full 
Investigation may be 
conducted to prevent, 
solve, or prosecute such 
unlawful activity.244 
• The term reasonable 
indication has a lower 
criminal threshold than 
that of probable cause.  
• Full investigations allow 
all lawful investigative 
techniques and are 
authorized for one year.  
• Extensions are granted 
only for another year.  
• Investigations should not 
last more than 3 years. 
Typically, if the planning 
for a future act is 
occurring, that planning 
is usually a violation 
under certain provisions 
of state law.  
• Full inquiries end with 
the decision whether to 




This type of 
investigation:  
• Must determine the 
identity and nature of 
the individual group or 
organization involved, 
its geographic 
dimensions, its past acts 
and intended goals, 
including unlawful 
goals, and its capacity 
for harm, among other 
factors. While a 
standard investigation 
of unlawful conduct 
terminates with the 
decision whether to 
prosecute, a terrorism 
enterprise investigation 
does not necessarily 
end, even though one or 
more of the participants 
may have been 
prosecuted.246 




• Detectives piece 
together a mass of 
information that 
standing on its own may 
have no investigative 
value. 
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3. Tactical Operations (221) 
This section of the PG is the newest as it was created within the last 10 years.  
The topics discussed in this section include the NYPD’s force guidelines and active  
shooter protocols.  
a. Force Guidelines (Procedure 221-01) 
In response to the growing number of vehicle ramming attacks worldwide, the 
NYPD amended its force guidelines. This change has enabled officers to end a potential 
attack more quickly. Under Patrol Guide Procedure 221-01, “members of the service 
SHALL NOT: Discharge their firearms at or from a moving vehicle unless deadly force is 
being used against the member of the service or another person present, by means other 
than a moving vehicle” (original emphasis).247 To clarify, if a motor vehicle approached 
an officer at a high rate of speed that put the officer’s safety in danger, the officer would 
not be authorized to discharge a firearm to impede the person from striking him or her. The 
officer would be allowed to use his firearm only if the driver of the motor vehicle were also 
using another form of deadly physical force to supplement the vehicle. Essentially, the 
driver would have to be firing a firearm at the officer, throwing a Molotov cocktail, or 
using another form of deadly physical force against that officer.  
The new change allows an officer to discharge their firearm at a vehicle that they 
reasonably believe is being used in a vehicle ramming attack. The new amendment explains 
that “a ‘vehicle ramming attack’ is the type of extraordinary event that this clause is 
intended to address. The objectively reasonable use of deadly physical force to terminate a 
mass casualty terrorist event would be legally justified and within department 
guidelines.”248  
 
247 New York City Police Department, Tactical Operations: Force Guidelines, Patrol Guide Procedure 
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b. Use of Force (Procedure 221-02) 
The overarching goal of this PG procedure is to convey that the use of force is part 
of being a police officer, but the appropriate force is the minimum to gain compliance. 
Police officers should use de-escalation techniques to avoid using force, such as requesting 
additional police officers, a supervisor, or the ESU. If force is necessary, officers should 
avoid such actions as sitting or standing on a subject’s back or chest, thus restraining the 
individual’s ability to breathe properly. The procedure offers definitions that apply to 
demonstrations: 
• “Passive Resistance: Minimal physical action to prevent a member 
from performing their lawful duty. For example, a subject failing to 
comply with a lawful command and stands motionless and/or a subject 
going limp when being taken into custody.”249 
• “Resisting Arrest (NYS Penal Law): A person is guilty of resisting 
arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a police 
officer or peace officer from effecting an authorize arrest of himself or 
another person.”250 
• “Active Resisting: Includes physically evasive movements to defeat a 
member of the service’s attempt at control, including bracing, tensing, 
pushing, or verbally signaling an intention to avoid or prevent being 
taken into or retained in custody.”251 
c. Use of Tear Gas (Procedure 221-09) 
Tear gas is described as a substance that can be used judiciously by the ESU to 
minimize the potential for serious physical injury. The procedure outlines the possibility 
of tear gas causing injury, making care and planning necessary for its use. When a ranking 
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supervisor at the scene of an incident believes that tear gas may be needed to help further 
control the area, he or she will forward the request to the CO, executive officer, duty 
captain, BC, the ESU, and an ESU supervisor. The BC makes the ultimate decision whether 
tear gas is deployed. The ranking ESU officer will determine the tactical factors in its use. 
If it is permissible, before the tear gas is deployed, the BC in conjunction with the ESU 
will establish a mobilization point, tactically place officers a safe distance as not to be 
contaminated, request a decontamination truck be deployed to the mobilization point, and 
request a patrol wagon and emergency medical services. The procedure does not provide 
the initial supervisor with guidelines for determining when tear gas may be warranted.252 
d. Use of Department Canine Teams (Procedure 221-18) 
Canines are a tool that law enforcement agencies use around the world. This 
procedure outlines the times when canines are authorized. It is clearly stated in the 
procedure that the use of canine teams is not authorized for crowd control “or as a deterrent 
for peaceful demonstrations.”253 If a demonstration falls out of the peaceful realm, a request 
has to be made directly to the chief of patrol for their use.254  
e. Active Shooter Response Protocol (Procedure 221-12) 
During the process of writing this thesis, three major active shooter tragedies 
occurred in the United States. Twenty-two people were killed in a Walmart in El Paso, 
Texas.255 Nine people were killed and 27 others injured in a nightclub in Dayton, Ohio.256 
Seven people were killed and 21 more injured after a man randomly opened fire after being 
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stopped by police for a traffic infraction outside Odessa, Texas.257 All three scenes have a 
number of different variables proving that active shooter protocols are relevant in any 
situation where people are in a mass gathering environment.  
The procedure begins with an explanation about the importance of the procedure 
and the fluidity of an active shooter environment. The procedure defines multiple terms, 
including active shooter, hostage situation, and rescue task force, and delineates threat 
zones. The key concept of the procedure is that officers should not wait for more tactical 
units or officers to arrive; they should engage the threat immediately. The procedure 
assumes that the shooter is inside a building. Active shooters situations that occur at a 
demonstration have the possibility of the shooter fleeing into a building. The initial 
supervisor on scene, before engaging the threat, should ensure through the 
Communications Division that the ESU, SRG, CRC, Hostage Negotiation Team, TARU, 
Bomb Squad, the CO or duty captain, and EMS are all notified and responding. 
The second supervisor on scene will become the incident commander until the next 
highest rank arrives. The incident commander has multiple tasks to accomplish such as 
establishing a cold zone and incident command post, a perimeter, and a casualty collection 
point, as well as creating a rescue task force to remove wounded persons from the scene. 
A cold zone in the procedure is defined as follows: “Areas where there is normal risk due 
to geographic distance from the threat, or the area has been secured by police personnel. 
The command post, operations post, staging areas, and medical triage, treatment, and 
transportation areas shall be located within [the] designated Cold Zone.”258 Force 
protection is neither discussed as one of the incident commander’s duties nor defined. 
Incident commanders need to deploy a group of officers whose sole responsibility is the 
protection of assets arriving on scene. Officers may become hyper-focused on the situation 
and lose sight of the overall scene.  
 
257 Manny Fernandez, Neil Vigdor, and Christopher Mele, “Texas Shooting Leaves 7 Dead and at 
Least 21 Injured Near Odessa,” New York Times, August 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/
us/odessa-shootings.html. 
258 New York City Police Department, Tactical Operations: Active Shooter Response Protocol, Patrol 
Guide Procedure No. 221-12 (New York: New York City Police Department, 2016), 2. 
77 
The procedure also highlights that armed security and off-duty law enforcement 
agents may already be involved before police arrive. Acknowledging this situation reduces 
the possibility of friendly fire. All off-duty law enforcement agents are required to call 
9-1-1 and clearly identify themselves including what they are wearing. Likewise, if 
plainclothes officers are first on scene, they also must notify communications of exactly 
what they are wearing. However, such officers cannot enter the scene once uniformed 
members of the service have arrived.  
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V. NYPD CASE STUDY ANALYSIS FOR  
TERRORISM IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter focuses on the lessons learned from the five events discussed in the 
case studies chapter. This chapter reviews the critical concepts for the analysis of the five 
case studies and sets the approach for their discussion. Key findings appear in the order of 
the case study chapter—demonstrations and then terror attacks. The lenses of the NYPD 
units and procedures provide the framework for analysis and specific suggestions for 
improving current policy. 
A. PRE-DEMONSTRATION INTELLIGENCE  
Officers who are policing a demonstration should be afforded all knowledge about 
the group or persons demonstrating. As shown in Charlottesville, having two groups of 
demonstrators on opposite sides of the issue led to catastrophe. The policing of special 
events and crowd control procedures in the Patrol Guide discuss demonstrations at 
length.259 However, the bulk of the discussion highlights tasks primarily for the incident 
commander. It neglects to mention that the incident commander should inform middle 
management such as lieutenants and sergeants about the group protesting. Such factors 
include previous arrests of demonstrators, the number that have typically participated, any 
violent tendencies, and a history of marching to another location. All are vital tools that 
should be conveyed if known to all officers, regardless of rank, at the demonstration. As 
discussed before, all NYPD officers have department-issued cell phones that need to be 
used to their advantage. Incident commanders can send a Domain Awareness System 
message to all officers in the vicinity that contains vital information about the 
demonstration.  
Before large protests the NYPD attempts to meet with event organizers to discuss 
the event and maintain peace. In some of these meetings, protesters may disclose their 
intention to be arrested. This prior knowledge allows police commanders to properly staff 
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the demonstration with officers who are trained in mass arrests and disorder control. Yet, 
regarding the yellow jacket protests, nothing in the literature says whether French 
authorities conducted outreach before a demonstration. 
B. ACTIVE SHOOTERS 
Numerous demonstrators at the Unite the Right rally carried firearms, making the 
potential for an active shooter situation quite high. The PG procedure that discusses active 
shooters is clearly written and very detailed. As relevant to demonstrations, a terrorist could 
enter a protest pen under false pretenses with a concealed firearm and inflict carnage from 
within. He or she may also simply start firing into a pen of protesters from the outside. 
NYPD patrol officers complete firearms qualification training twice a year. Select officers 
also receive active shooter training based on availability. Officers must also attend in-
service tactical training once every two years. The 2019–2020 curriculum cycle includes 
moving while shooting and shooting at moving targets. This training is conducted with 
laser-sighted firearms, not actual firearms. A terrorist may flee into a subway station or 
building, which will create even more challenges for officers than in an open-air 
environment. Officers need to engage the threat immediately to prevent future loss of life. 
Supervisors at the deployment of personnel before a demonstration should discuss the key 
points of this procedure before the officers take their posts. 
C. FIRE 
The unfortunate death of NYPD Police Officer Dennis Guerra spurred an update to 
the PG’s fire procedure. Officer Guerra and his partner, Officer Rosa Rodriguez, responded 
to a fire inside a housing development on the 13th floor.260 The officers rode the elevator 
to that floor and smoke immediately overtook them.261 Guerra died of smoke inhalation, 
and Rodriguez was critically injured.262 The updated policy instructs officers in properly 
 






entering a building on fire should they choose to do so in an effort to save lives. The policy 
does, however, have some glaring weaknesses regarding fires in other arenas.  
Traditionally, at either a planned or pop-up demonstration, FDNY personnel and 
equipment do not respond. The FDNY learns of the event through the FDNY lieutenant 
assigned to OPS. Most NYPD vehicles carry a small fire extinguisher. Fire itself is an 
element of concern because of its versatility. One of the images contained within the ISIS 
propaganda poster discussed in the yellow jacket case study was a Molotov cocktail. Fire 
can be used both as a weapon and as a distraction technique.263 At the scene of a 
demonstration, participants are not searched. Concealable items such as knives and 
handguns are already a concern for officers operating in proximity to protestors. As 
discussed in his capture, Ramani had a concealed firearm and used it against law 
enforcement. Items of recent concern are reusable plastic and aluminum water bottles due 
to their growing popularity. A terrorist could fill one of these vessels with gasoline or 
another accelerant, attend a demonstration with Molotov cocktails in one’s possession, and 
not elevate an officer’s suspicion.264 
Tactically, officers are on foot at demonstrations and may be a distance away from 
their vehicles. If fire were used as a distraction or weapon, police officers already on scene 
would need to retreat to their vehicles to obtain the fire suppression tool and return to the 
scene. This exit would remove manpower from the scene and require that police officers 
become firefighters, which is not what they are trained to do. The PG’s fire policy needs 
to be updated to discuss fire in this non-traditional form.  
In France, during a May Day demonstration, demonstrators pelted French police 
officers with Molotov cocktails.265 Demonstrators also set items ablaze in a shopping cart 
and rolled them toward police formations.266 Protestors also began to light property on 
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fire.267 In a video of this event, no firefighters appeared to be working with police 
officers.268 An obvious recommendation for such demonstrations is not for firefighters to 
work with police officers on the frontline but for better lines of communication to be put 
in place for firefighters to respond more rapidly to scenes. The NYPD needs to apply 
lessons learned from events like this in France. If a scene were to unfold on the streets of 
Manhattan where fire was used as a weapon or distraction, it would provide a golden 
opportunity for a terrorist to strike during all the confusion that followed. Rahami could 
have accompanied his pressure cooker devices with cannisters of a flammable substance 
to cause further devastation. Moreover, Saipov, instead of running away from the vehicle 
after it crashed into the school bus, could have attempted to blow up the car by igniting the 
fuel tank. 
D. MOBILE DEMONSTRATIONS AND RAMMING ATTACKS  
As was discussed in the Unite the Right demonstration case study, protesters on the 
move can lead to chaos. If a protest becomes mobile from a location, any of the hardening 
techniques used at a specific location become useless. For example, if a group protests in 
Duffy Square, located in the heart of Times Square, cement pilings surrounding the square 
make it extremely difficult for a terrorist to conduct a ramming attack. If the group decides 
to march to Trump Tower or Union Square, however, it now becomes vulnerable to this 
style of attack outside the pilings. It is not feasible to harden every sidewalk in NYC to 
thwart a ramming attack. Currently, locations receive priority based on pedestrian volume 
and the propensity for a terror attack. 
On larger planned and stationary protests, the NYPD has techniques to harden the 
site as much as possible. These techniques include the use of sand and sanitation trucks to 
block vehicle traffic from tertiary streets entering the location.269 Figure 11 shows the 
NYPD’s dump trucks that aid in hardening a location. If the event is expected to grow large 
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demonstrations, these tools cannot be used, thus leaving a large vulnerability for a ramming 
attack.270  
 
Figure 11. NYPD Dump Trucks Hardening a Location271  
As of spring 2019, the Training Bureau through the Firearm and Tactics Section 
has begun to open tactical training centers around the city. Officers are sent to these centers 
for two-hour increments during their tour of duty to refresh their knowledge of tactical 
procedures. The center located in Manhattan is an excellent location where PBMS 
personnel may retrain on disorder control procedures. Officers are not required to train for 
an entire day but only a portion of it so as not to harm patrol manning.  
Sergeants and lieutenants must set a tone of vigilance at the onset of a political 
demonstration. Officers handle these situations on such on frequent basis that complacency 
becomes an issue. Supervisors must ensure that officers operate within all guidelines and 
protect the First Amendment rights of everyone at the scene. Likewise, they must ensure 
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officers are cognizant that, at any moment, an act of violence or terrorism is possible no 
matter how small or large the demonstration is. Members of the observing public and 
NYPD executives will witness this strong leadership and feel confident that the 
demonstration is being policed with the highest efficiency. A possible terrorist might also 
see this display and think twice about conducting an act of violence. One could argue that 
if James Alex Fields Jr. had seen confident, cohesive policing in Charlottesville, he might 
have hesitated to ram his car into the group of counter-protesters. 
NYPD policymakers saw the trend in vehicle ramming–style attacks and made the 
appropriate changes in the PG, now allowing officers to discharge their weapons for such 
an attack.272 When this change was implemented it was just a simple announcement. The 
Firearm and Tactics Section should explore the potential for implementing target shooting 
on a moving target as well as moving and shooting with real ammunition in conjunction 
with what is being taught at the in-service tactical training, as previously mentioned. Even 
though this training is held for specialty units that use long guns, the department should 
explore implementing it for patrol officers. After Saipov crashed into the school bus, it was 
Officer Nash assigned to a patrol precinct, not a specialty unit, who ended the threat. 
E. USE OF TEAR GAS  
The lack of tear gas use in NYC over the last decade fits with the NYPD’s soft 
tactics model. As seen in France, the use of tear gas can inspire further confrontations with 
police. Numerous videos show demonstrators hurling the cannisters back at police 
officers.273 The NYPD relies heavily on its ability to summon hordes of officers to a site 
expeditiously. This tactic has helped to avoid chaotic scenes in NYC as seen in France. 
Lessons learned from the case in France validate the NYPD’s policy, which should not be 
modified at this time. The use of tear gas, unless absolutely necessary, would be 
counterproductive and might aid in the distraction of police and allow a terrorist to carry 
out a plot.  
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F. DISTRACTION  
As seen in the attack in Jamaica, police officers’ becoming too engaged in a specific 
event leads to vulnerabilities. As discussed in the mass arrest processing procedure, officers 
are required to take photographs with their prisoners before they are transported for 
processing. An additional data statement should be incorporated into this procedure 
mandating that supervisors provide a layer of security for the officer posing for the 
photograph, the officer taking the photograph, and the prisoner. 
The NYPD has a training tool known as New York City Police Department 
University: an application available on officers’ cell phones and desktops inside precinct 
station houses. Various units post videos and quizzes that officers are required to complete. 
This teaching style highlights numerous different areas such as legal issues, tactical 
concepts, and changes in certain procedures. One of the videos released involved officers 
remaining vigilant while using their department-issued cell phones. Partners must learn to 
communicate with each other, letting the other know when one is engaging with something 
on the cell phone. The technology installed on NYPD officers’ cell phones is cutting edge, 
as discussed in the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative section. Officers can access vital 
intelligence before arriving at a call for service. For example, if a call comes in at 123 4th 
Street, officers can query the history of the building, all previous 9-1-1 calls, and active 
warrants, arrest histories, and known emotionally disturbed behavior among the residents. 
When accessing this information, officers must remain vigilant of their surroundings to 
help prevent attacks like the one in Queens.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The NYPD’s policies in the realm of political demonstrations are thorough and 
numerous. In an ever-changing world of terrorism, the policies need to reflect current 
trends. Terrorists execute simplistic scenarios using everyday tools as weapons. NYPD 
leadership needs to provide the officers who serve the greatest city in the world the proper 
training, intelligence, and tactical positions to keep the city safe. Following from the 
analysis, this chapter identifies and discusses areas in need of improvement. Preventing all 
terror attacks given the enormous number of attractive locations, especially in NYC, poses 
an impossible task.274 By adopting these policy, training, intelligence, and tactical 
recommendations, the NYPD will continue to set the standard for large police departments 
worldwide and further reduce the risk of a terror attacks at political demonstrations.  
This chapter presents material in the order of most to least critical, from the researcher’s 
view, in policing large political protests after reviewing the cases, the PA curriculum, and 
the PG.  
A. OPS UNIT DATABASE  
Before starting this research, I was unaware that the database existed. This database 
needs to be used more as a tool than a simple record, but it is archaic and needs to be 
updated. More categories need to be added, more units need viewing access, and the ability 
to search by every parameter must be implemented. While conducting research, I read 
about a large number of protests with over 1,000 people occurring around the United States 
and in Washington, DC.275 The databases need to be searchable to analyze the many large-
scale protests that have occurred in a given timeframe. 
When a supervisor or other officer calls OPS regarding a demonstration, the OPS 
member should make an immediate inquiry and relay all known information to the inquirer. 
The database should be implemented into DAS, which has developed into a one-stop shop 
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for many NYPD functions. If supervisors in the field can access this information from their 
iPhones, additional intelligence-based strategies could be implemented. The caveat with 
this implementation would be that officers have access to research political organizations 
not under the purview of INTEL’s Handschu Committee. 
B. TRAINING 
Properly executing the NYPD’s policy starts with executive and mid-level 
supervisors. Before being promoted to a supervisory rank, officers must complete a 
leadership development course taught at the PA. When a member is promoted to one of 
these three ranks, they are transferred to a different precinct, transit district, or PSA. During 
this course, it is imperative that experienced executives and other supervisors speak to the 
class about their experiences managing demonstrations and what expectations exist for 
them. These speakers should come from the Strategic Response Unit or Disorder Control 
Unit or be patrol personnel who deal with demonstrations frequently. 
The Training Bureau in conjunction with the SRG, DCU, and PBMS should 
implement a new training course that outlines the fundamentals of policing riots, 
demonstrations, and large mass gatherings. Emphasis must be given on site security and 
the existing trends of vehicle ramming attacks, knife attacks, and the use of fire as both a 
weapon and distraction. Most demonstrations occur within the confines of the PBMS. 
Officers assigned to the PBMS command will be required to attend this training on an 
annual basis. This training must include a legal component to it. Currently at 
demonstrations, there is a mentality of waiting. PBMS officers assume that they cannot 
take any police action because the Legal Bureau, SRG, and TARU will. The training should 
encompass scenarios illustrating for officers when a law has been broken and whether it is 
appropriate to take immediate action or wait for specialty units to respond. 
Field training officers should be given priority when the training goes into effect. 
They are responsible for guidance to new officers, and providing the new officers with 
wisdom from an early stage of their careers would be increasingly beneficial. Then, officers 
would be in the position to have the knowledge from the onset and be extra beneficial 
during the demonstrations themselves. 
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The SRG and DCU frequently conduct mobilization drills for their personnel. 
These drills reinforce the officers’ training and confirm that officers are prepared to 
respond to an actual demonstration. Patrol officers are assigned to planned protests and are 
the first responders for a pop-up demonstration. Patrol officers must begin to participate in 
these drills. Manpower issues have always plagued patrol precincts, but that should not 
interfere with training.  
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PBMS DEMONSTRATION GUIDE 
In analyzing the SG and PG, I have determined there is a need for clarification and 
simplification for all officers responding to pop-up demonstrations. A checklist was 
modeled after a PG procedure to outline clearly situations that may be vague for responding 
officers. The checklist also incorporates the use of officers who may contribute to 
intelligence gathering and relationship building with the community (demonstrators and 
bystanders). As the NYPD underwent the transition to the NCO model of policing, it should 
be reflected in all its policies as much as possible. This checklist could also serve as an 
additional Activity Log insert. The NYPD is currently in the pilot stages of a virtual 
Activity Log that is maintained on an officer’s department-issued iPhone. This checklist 
could be added seamlessly to this set of documents and further educate and prepare officers 
for demonstrations. The checklist/PG procedure appears in Appendix A. 
D. BODY-WORN CAMERAS  
Demonstrations have the potential of requiring a rapid mandatory camera activation 
because peaceful protests can turn into civil disobedience quickly. Frequently, the core of 
a demonstration is anti-government in some fashion, and people target their frustration on 
the police, who are an extension of the government. This fluidity leaves grey areas in 
determining when to activate cameras. Amendments must be made to the procedure 
instructing the ranking supervisor when to give an order for all officers at the scene to 
activate their cameras under the mandatory activation provisions. This supervisor should 
also deem a lieutenant to ensure that this order is adhered to. 
One of the responsibilities of BWC users is to enter metadata into their recordings’ 
video files. For example, if an officer is at the scene when an individual is placed under 
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arrest, the officer—after docking his camera and allowing the video file to upload to the 
cloud—must categorize the video as an arrest, input the arrest number into the correct field, 
and tag the video—just as in a call for service and vehicle stop or when force is used. Most 
importantly, the AO must share the video with the corresponding district attorney (DA)’s 
office. Current PBMS policy is that the AO is responsible for sharing all pertinent footage 
with the DA’s office. If there were four officers at the scene of an arrest, all are required to 
activate their BWCs. The AO would have to access either the Evidence.com platform for 
AXON camera users or the VIEVU platform for LE-4 users. These procedures are not often 
followed with 100 percent accuracy, so the DA’s office is forced to reach out to the AO 
and his or her supervisors to gain access to the video files. 
In 2019, New York state passed a set of criminal justice reform bills. Under these 
new laws, which go into effect in January 2020, prosecutors share evidence early in the 
case with defense attorneys.276 Defense attorneys no longer have to request evidence from 
the DA’s office because the DA must automatically turn it over within 15 days.277 This 
reaffirms the need for AOs to share all relevant BWC footage with the DA’s office as 
expeditiously as possible. At the scene of a demonstration where an arrest occurs, officers 
respond from numerous NYPD units, as discussed in the previous chapter. The PG 
procedure needs to be amended so that the same lieutenant responsible for ensuring the 
activation of the BWCs is also responsible for sharing the files.  
From a terrorism perspective, BWCs could serve as a crucial investigative aid, 
especially if an attacker is not apprehended immediately after an attack. The hours of 
footage captured by the dozens of officers who would have likely been instructed to 
activate their BWCs under the upgraded policy may help in the apprehension. BWCs would 
provide different vantage points of the events of an attack as well as powerful witness and 
victim testimonies, which may aid in convictions. TARU and DAS cameras may miss 
something that a BWC may catch. The correct use of BWCs also allows the NYPD to own 
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the material its officers capture. It does not have to rely on civilian cell phone videos or 
private business cameras, which may require subpoenas and might not even capture the 
footage needed.  
E. INTELLIGENCE 
The sheer size of the NYPD is both a blessing and a curse. As shown, several units 
play a part in political demonstrations. Intelligence gaps must be closed. A glaring issue is 
the use of plainclothes officers. INTEL operates with minimum information sharing with 
PBMS personnel. If plainclothes officers are present at a demonstration, all officers should 
be made aware. In 2019, the NYPD suffered the devastating loss of two officers to friendly 
fire. If an active shooter situation was to occur inside a demonstration pen and uniformed 
officers were not aware of the presence of plainclothes officers there, the results could be 
tragic. At the scene of planned demonstrations, executives must reinforce among 
uniformed officers the possibility of plainclothes officers being present at the scene and 
announce the color of the day. Observing that bright orange wrist band may be the thing 
that stops a uniformed officer from discharging his or her firearm at a fellow officer. NCOs 
are a vital tool for the intelligence-gathering effort from a counterterrorism framework. As 
discussed previously, one of the factors for INTEL’s success is that it operates at the local 
level. Precinct field intelligence officers must forge a strong bond with NCOs because 
NCOs are the link between the local precincts, transit districts, PSAs, and INTEL. 
Executives and mid-level supervisors must inform their officers of the availability of 
resources on the department iPhone. Officers have access to weekly INTEL 
counterterrorism briefings and can educate themselves on trends and topics occurring 
around the world that may have an impact on NYC. 
F. HANDSCHU GUIDELINES 
The preamble for the guidelines for investigating political organizations is as 
follows: 
Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on the City of New York on September 
11, 2001 which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and the total 
destruction of the World Trade Center complex, it became apparent that the 
city faces unprecedented threats to its continued safety and security. In the 
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view of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, the prevention 
of further attacks requires the development of intelligence and the 
investigation of potential terrorist activity before an unlawful act occurs.278 
This is a powerful statement that continues to be a driving force in why the Handschu 
guidelines are a challenge for INTEL investigators in fulfilling their duties. Officers, other 
than those assigned to INTEL—especially in an investigative function in areas that have a 
propensity for political activity—need to be taught the intricacies of the guidelines. If the 
prosecution of a potential terrorist were dismissed due to a missed step during the 
investigation process, it would be devastating.  
The NYPD’s interpretation of the Handschu guidelines have come into question in 
recent years over intelligence gathering within the Muslim community.279 NYC officials 
have stood by the NYPD, stating that the department has not violated the guidelines based 
on the number of foiled terror attacks since 9/11.280 With the popularity of political 
demonstrations and their expected growth, the NYPD’s methods will likely be questioned 
again. The existence of these guidelines proves that the balance between effective 
counterterrorism policing strategies and civil liberties is challenging and complex. 
NCOs and precinct community affairs officers should be given the same Handschu 
guideline training that members of INTEL receive. As previously discussed, these officers 
develop close ties with the community, and members of the community may feel 
comfortable enough to discuss with NCOs the odd or possible terroristic behavior of one 
of their own. Having this training, the NCOs would know who in INTEL to discuss this 
with and possibly lead to the start of an investigation.  
All NYPD officers who conduct community outreach or are involved in any pre-
operational intelligence involving a political organization must be cognizant of Handschu’s 
relevance. This knowledge is crucial because if Rahami or Fields had been members of a 
political group, these guidelines would have applied. As discussed, in the OPS Database, 
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INTEL communicates all prior intelligence with OPS for input and proper dissemination. 
All officers who operate in an investigative capacity must be trained on the guidelines to 
ensure an investigation is not be impeded or ended. 
G. TACTICAL 
Anti-crime officers should be fitted with hard personnel protective equipment. It is 
not necessary to fit every officer in each command, but having select experienced officers 
would be beneficial. These officers could rapidly deploy within the borough if a scene 
becomes violent or a terror attack occurs at location where disorder is still occurring.  
These officers would have to go through the same training as officers whose units wear 
this style of equipment. Having these officers trained and ready to respond with a higher 
level of police gear will give executives the option of balancing between hard and soft 
police tactics.281 
H. CANINE AND MOUNTED TEAMS 
In the realm of police tactics, the use of canines and horses would be considered 
hard.282 The analysis in this thesis has shown that the NYPD has adopted a softer stance 
for handling demonstrations. The NYPD has taken a modified stance in this framework in 
that the use of the Mounted Unit for crowd control is still an option. The MU has been used 
less and less as demonstrations have become more frequent. This may be the reason NYC 
has a tendency for less violence at demonstrations than in other countries and cities. The 
use of animals at political demonstrations could serve more in a negative fashion than 
positive. Canine teams need to be made aware of political demonstrations and be able to 
respond immediately if a scene becomes adversarial. Incident commanders should be 
cognizant that the use of mounted officers as a tool in helping restore order might have an 
adverse effect in further agitating demonstrators. The following figure shows MU officers 
restoring order at a demonstration. 
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Figure 12. NYPD Mounted Unit Policing a Demonstration in Times Square283  
I. CONCLUSION 
The NYPD has taken drastic steps since 9/11 to help dramatically reduce the 
possibility of terror attacks from happening within NYC limits again. The organization is 
also better prepared to deal with the aftermath of a large-scale attack and recovery efforts. 
The NYPD needs to fine-tune some of its policies to remain current with the existing trends 
of vehicle ramming attacks and edged weapon attacks at political demonstrations. The 
NYPD bolstered its counterterrorism efforts in a post-9/11 world by creating the CRC and 
expanding the Counterterrorism Bureau, INTEL, and SRG. In this effort, routine patrol 
officers have fallen by the wayside. The training of personnel assigned to patrol needs the 
most attention. These officers receive no in-service disorder control training, which needs 
to be addressed. Leadership must dedicate a contingency of officers—assigned to police a 
demonstration—dedicated to overall site security and not to the demonstrators. Improving 
the OPS Database and enhancing the procedures pertaining to its use will allow it to serve 
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as a tool, not just a record. Although certain elements cannot be stopped, constant vigilance 
from a training, tactical, and intelligence framework will aid in minimizing damage and 
return life to normal quickly after an event. 
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APPENDIX A.  POP-UP DEMONSTRATION CHECKLIST FOR 
MANHATTAN SOUTH PATROL BOROUGH 
1. Police Officer 
a. When receiving a radio run for a disorderly group or demonstration,  
i. Ensure that the Patrol Supervisor is aware of the assignment. 
b. If the job originates as a pickup or upon arrival on scene dispatched by 
Radio,  
i. Transmit all factors immediately to central; ensure the Patrol 
Supervisor is aware of 
1. Approx. size of the group, 
2. Group name if applicable, and  
3. Disorderly or Orderly. 
a. Are they in the street? 
b. Are they blocking the entrance to an establishment? 
c. Is there any violent behavior whatsoever? 
d. Are they wearing facemasks? 
e. Do they have signs that could be used as weapons? 
2. Patrol Supervisor  
a. Confirm all facts given by the first officer on scene. 
i. Obtain additional facts if applicable. 
b. Establish a dialogue with the event organizer. 
i. Approach the person in a calm and professional manner: 
1. Understand that it is their First Amendment right to protest;  
2. Public safety and quality of life must be maintained. 
ii. Inform person that you are there to enforcement the law impartially 
and that you understand their right to protest in a lawful manner.  
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iii. Fact Finding 
1. Ask Questions such as  
a. Group name if unknown 
b. How long do you plan to demonstrate? 
c. Do you expect more demonstrators to join? 
d. Do you plan to conduct an act of civil 
disobedience? 
i. Purposely being arrested? 
e. Do you plan to march to another location? 
c. Notify Central of all Pertinent information as you obtain it. 
i. Whether demonstrators are engaging in dialogue or not. 
d. Notify CO/Executive Officer/Duty Captain in that order 
i. If you are confident that your CO/Executive Officer is not 
working, immediately notify PBMS so that proper notification can 
be made to Duty Captain. 
e. Notify PBMS Wheel. 
i. Include all information you have, including which executive you 
spoke to. 
f. Notify Operations Unit 
i. Have Operations Personnel run an inquiry on database to extract 
any further information about the group: 
1. Group 
2. Location 
3. Have they taken arrests? 
4. Have they marched? 
5. Violent tendencies 
g. Call Level 1 Mobilization if the following factors exist: 
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i. Protesters are engaging in civil disobedience,  
ii. Protestors greatly outnumber the responding police officers, and 
iii. With the resources you have, you are unable to provide overall site 
security. 
1. Maintaining the safety of officers, demonstrators, and 
bystanders is paramount 
2. Any mass gathering has the potential to fall victim to 
violence including a terror attack. 
3. Maintain order by establishing that the police are in control 
of the entire scene, and any criminality will not be 
tolerated. 
h. Notify Legal and TARU if the following factors exist: 
i. Group is engaging in civil disobedience, or 
ii. In your professional judgement, they are likely to engage in civil 
disobedience.  
i. Ensure that vehicular and pedestrian traffic is maintained. 
i. Utilize precinct traffic personnel if working to assist.  
3. Desk Officer 
a. Notify the following to respond if working: 
i. NCO Sergeant,  
ii. Corresponding NCOs, 
iii. Community Affairs Personnel, and 
iv. Traffic Sergeant or Traffic Personnel.  
4. CO/Executive Officer/Duty Captain 
a. Respond to the scene if any of the following factors exist: 
i. Over 40 demonstrators 
ii. Engaging in civil disobedience 
100 
iii. Location is vulnerable (sensitive to media attention or terror 
attack) 
iv. Group is already known and has a violent or arrest history  
b. If PBMS mobiles are not being used at another scene, deploy them to 
location. 
c. Ensure that the Patrol Supervisor has notified Operations and received any 
pertinent facts about the demonstration. 
d. Confer with Patrol Supervisor if the need for a Level 1 exists.  
 
Notes 
• Patrol Bureau Manhattan South Mobiles. Dedicated officers at the discretion 
of the morning and afternoon duty captain to respond to pop-up 
demonstrations or protests. Officers are assigned from the 10 commands and 
do not receive the level of training that SRG does as it pertains to crowd 
control and mass arrest situations.  
• Once an event is seen on social media, there is the likelihood of media 
coverage, further demonstrators contributing, and the possibility of a terror 
attack occurring. 
• Utilize Community Affairs officers or NCOs to monitor social media. 
• Do not effect arrests unless the risk of injury or the destruction of property is 
imminent; work in a team concept and await guidance from Captain to arrive 
on scene.  
• Legal and TARU are necessary in successful prosecution of perpetrators. 
• Enhanced version of PG 213-02 
• Know the difference between situations where you would wait for Legal, 
TARU, and SRG to handle acts of civil disobedience.  
• If a crime such as an assault or criminal mischief occurs, DO NOT wait for 
the above listed units’ arrival. Immediately take appropriate police action.  
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APPENDIX B.  RANKS 
A. POLICE OFFICER 
The largest rank in the department. Officers serve typically as the front line in 
interactions with the public. Officers typically serve as patrol officers and neighborhood 
coordination officers and in various administrative and enforcement assignments. Officers 
effect arrests, issue citations, and complete different reports (e.g., complaint, domestic 
incident, and aided).284 
B. DETECTIVE INVESTIGATOR AND DETECTIVE SPECIALIST 
Detective specialists are meritoriously promoted from the rank of police officer. 
They perform the same services as police officers. Detective investigators are promoted 
after completing 18 months within an investigative unit. Investigative units include 
narcotics modules, precinct detective units, vice modules, and the fugitive enforcement 
division. Detective investigators are tasked with effecting arrests for past events.285 
C. SERGEANT 
Frontline supervisor for the NYPD after passing a civil service exam and having 
five years of service. Sergeants usually serve as the precinct’s desk officer and the patrol 
supervisor. The desk officer oversees all police functions within the precinct station house 
(e.g., walk-in complaints, supervision of prisoners, and supervision of various 
administrative staff). The patrol supervisor oversees all officers assigned in the field and 
responds to all incidents in which an individual is arrested, an officer uses force, or a crime 
involves a weapon. Sergeants oversee a squad of approximately eight officers, depending 
on the size of their precinct.286  
 
284 New York City Police Department, “Introduction to the NYPD,” in Police Student’s Guide (New 
York: New York City Police Department, 2019), 21. 
285 New York City Police Department. 
286 New York City Police Department. 
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D. LIEUTENANT 
Lieutenants are promoted from the rank of sergeant after passing a civil service 
exam and must have two years in rank as a sergeant. Lieutenants primarily serve as a 
platoon commander. NYPD patrol, transit, and housing shifts are broken down into three 
tours of duty (i.e., the day tour, four to twelve, and midnight). Lieutenants are responsible 
for supervising all police functions in his or her platoon. Lieutenants also serve in such 
roles as the integrity control officer, operations coordinator, and special projects 
lieutenant.287  
E. CAPTAIN 
Lieutenants are promoted to the rank of captain after passing a civil service exam 
and having two years in rank as a lieutenant. Captains serve primarily as the executive 
officer (second in command) of a precinct, transit district, or PSA (policing of public 
housing developments). Captains all routinely serve as their respective parent command’s 
“duty captain.” New York City comprises eight patrol boroughs. On each tour, one captain 
for each borough is designated as having the duty. Duty captains respond to all major events 
that occur within the borough and act as incident commanders for such events unless a 
higher rank responds. Captains serve as zone commanders at large planned events.288 
F. DEPUTY INSPECTOR AND INSPECTOR 
Deputy inspectors (DIs) are meritoriously promoted from the rank of captain, and 
inspectors are meritoriously promoted from the rank of DI. Both ranks typically serve as 
precinct, transit district, and PSA commanding officers. Each borough has a designated 
“duty inspector”—as is the case with captains—on all three tours. DIs and inspectors 
typically serve as branch commanders for large planned events.289 
 
287 New York City Police Department. 
288 New York City Police Department. 
289 New York City Police Department. 
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G. FOUR LEVELS OF CHIEF 
Chiefs are meritoriously promoted from the rank of inspector and their previous 
chief ranks if applicable. On each tour, a chief is designated as the citywide duty chief to 
serve as incident commander for large planned events. The first rank of chief is deputy 
chief (one star on the uniform), followed by assistant chief (two stars), followed by bureau 
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